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ABSTRACT
This dissertation analyzes three policies in the field of energy and envi-
ronmental economics. Chapter 1 examines the impact of market design on
efficiency and emissions in the wholesale electricity market. Taking advantage
of Texas’ transition from a decentralized bilateral trading market to a central-
ized auction market, I find that information aggregation has a positive effect
on market efficiency that dominates any change in market power incentives.
Specifically, I show that, in the nine months following the transition, high-cost
generators are displaced by low-cost generators in production, leading to a
total cost saving of $30.7 million relative to the counterfactual. Although the
centralized market reduces generation costs, it also has an unintended effect
on pollution emissions. For moderate estimates of marginal damages, I find
the increase in external costs of emissions completely offsets the productive
efficiency gain.
Chapter 2 examines the impact of China’s fuel sulfur regulation—in partic-
ular, the introduction of CHINA III fuel standards—on air quality. Using both
a time-series regression discontinuity design and a difference-in-difference
method, I find that the implementation of CHINA III gasoline reduces air
pollution by 4-7 percent as measured by air pollution index (API). This
implies annual health benefits of 3.0 billion dollars, dwarfing the upgrading
ix
costs of 28.2 million dollars. By contrast, the introduction of CHINA III diesel
standard has only negligible impacts. Further investigation suggests that the
diesel standard may not have been complied with due to the inability to pass
costs through and the presence of a loophole in the diesel policy.
Chapter 3 is a joint work with Alecia Cassidy that examines the impact
of the mandatory pollution liability insurance on firms’ environmental com-
pliance performance in Shenzhen, China. The mandatory pollution liability
insurance is introduced as a market instrument to mitigate environmental risks.
While it protects firms from liability for accidents and hence may cause moral
hazard problems, firms are also incentivized to take more precautions regard-
ing their operations and handle hazardous pollutants more properly. We seek
to understand which of these effects wins out by examining the change in the
number of environmental violations following the introduction of the insurance
in Shenzhen. Using a novel dataset on environmental compliance performance
and a triple-difference estimation strategy, we find that the number of envi-




The Efficiency and Environmental Impacts of
Market Organization: Evidence from the Texas
Electricity Market
1.1 Introduction
How markets are organized is an important determinant of market performance. For many
commodities and financial assets, markets can be organized in two basic forms: a decentral-
ized market where transactions are conducted through private negotiations, and a central-
ized market where trades are intermediated by a central coordinator. For example, stocks
and bonds may be traded both over-the-counter and through centralized exchanges. Given
the possibility of different market forms, it is important to understand their relative merits.
Starting with Wolinsky’s (1990) seminal article, several theoretical studies have modeled
different market forms across dimensions such as asymmetric information, search frictions,
and market power (e.g., Dewatripont and Maskin (1995), Acharya and Bisin (2014), Glode
and Opp (2016)). However, these studies do not provide a clear consensus regarding which
market is more efficient, as it depends on the finer details of their models.
This paper adds insight into this question by providing empirical evidence on the rela-
tionship between market organization and efficiency. To do so, I focus on the US electric
sector. Over the past 20 years, this sector has undergone drastic reform, as 17 states plus
the District of Columbia have unbundled electric generation and retail service from trans-
mission and distribution. In these restructured states, the wholesale electricity market takes
the form of either a decentralized bilateral trading market or a centralized auction market.
While a bilateral trading market relies largely on individual firms to make private trans-
actions and dispatch decisions, a centralized market relies largely on a system operator
to make scheduling and dispatch decisions based on generator bids. Among both policy-
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makers and academics, the question of which market design supports a more efficient and
competitive wholesale power market has sparked significant debate (Hogan, 1995).
To address this question, I focus on the wholesale electricity market in Texas which
transitioned from a bilateral trading market to a centralized market on December 1, 2010.
I examine how this market redesign affects market efficiency and social welfare. On one
hand, a centralized market may improve market efficiency through information aggrega-
tion.1 An important feature of the electricity market is the presence of network externality.
It is difficult for market participants to resolve this externality in a bilateral way, due to
limited information processed by each participant about others’ production schedules. By
contrast, in a centralized market, a system operator can utilize its central position to ag-
gregate information from all generating units and minimize the bid-based costs. On the
other hand, a centralized market may reduce efficiency if it exacerbates firms’ incentive
to exercise market power. In a multi-unit auction, firms have the incentive to withhold
their capacity or submit bids in excess of their marginal costs to inflate the market-clearing
prices. Indeed, evidence of high price-cost margins has been found in other electricity mar-
kets.2 Therefore, whether a centralized market yields a more efficient outcome remains
an open question. Moreover, changes in market organization may also affect emissions
through reallocation of generating quantities among different resources. For social welfare
analysis, these environmental impacts should also be taken into account along with the ef-
ficiency impact.
The core of this paper exploits hourly unit-level generation data to estimate the effect of
the market redesign on generation allocation among units. The overnight change provides
an opportunity to estimate the effect without contamination from changes in other aspects
of the market such as generation capacity, technology and transmission capacity. These fac-
tors stayed the same within a short period preceding and following the redesign. However,
demand levels and fuel prices did change even within a short window of time. I therefore
rely on an econometric approach relating unit-level generation quantity to demand and fuel
prices to create a credible counterfactual of generation outcomes without the market re-
1In studying financial markets, Acharya and Bisin (2014) propose a model in which a lack of transparency
regarding trade positions leads to a counterparty risk externality. They also conclude that a centralized market
improves efficiency by aggregating information about these trades.
2See Joskow and Kahn (2002) and Borenstein et al (2002) for evidence of market power in the California
market. A growing body of research has also examined the role of transmission constraints and found that
congestion adds an additional layer to the complexity of the market and thus opens up more opportunities for
gaming. See Cardell et al (1997), Borenstein et al (2000), Joskow and Tirole (2000), Wolak (2015) and Ryan
(2017).
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design. I estimate this relationship semi-parametrically and separately for the pre-redesign
and post-redesign periods, and then use the estimates from the pre-redesign period to con-
struct the counterfactual allocation for the post-redesign period. This approach allows for
considerable flexibility and avoids the needs to model the complex grid and firm behavior
in detail. With the estimated changes in generation quantity for each unit and their cost and
emission information, I calculate the overall cost and emission changes in this market.
The primary finding of this paper is that the centralized market improves productive
efficiency. The market redesign leads to changes in generation allocation among resources
of different marginal costs. As low-cost thermal generators, coal plants as a whole pro-
duce 511 more MWh per hour, which is a 3% increase in overall coal capacity utilization.
The increase is significant at all levels of demand. For mid-cost combined-cycle natural
gas generators, generation decreases when demand is low, which is consistent with the in-
crease in coal. But when demand is high, there is no significant change for combined-cycle
generators, while the effect on high-cost gas generators, i.e. combustion turbines and steam
turbines, emerges. Specifically, generation from steam turbines decreases while generation
from combustion turbines increases. Overall, my results show that high-cost generators
are displaced by low-cost generators in the centralized market. Accordingly, the average
hourly generation cost is estimated to be $5,062 lower than what would have been, for the
nine months post redesign. This amounts to annual cost savings of $44.3 million, or a 0.5%
decrease in the total generation cost. These findings suggest that the benefits from infor-
mation aggregation outweigh potential market power changes associated with the move to
a centralized market.
While my results indicate a productive efficiency gain from the transition to a central-
ized market, I also find a negative environmental impact from this transition. Specifically, I
find that the increase in coal-based generation leads to an increase in carbon dioxide (CO2)
emissions by 351 tons per hour or 1.3 percent. Applying different estimates of the social
cost of carbon from the EPA (2016), I find that the increase in external costs of CO2 e-
missions completely offsets the private efficiency gain for moderate estimates of the social
cost. The market redesign also introduces changes in sulfur dioxide (SO2) and nitrogen
oxides (NOx) emissions. Overall, the market redesign is welfare-reducing if the external
costs of emissions are taken into account.
This paper builds on and contributes to the market design literature, especially in the
context of the electricity industry. While Joskow (2000) and Wilson (2002) provide an
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overview of the architecture of this industry, there is little empirical evidence on the rela-
tive performance of different organizational forms with the exception of Mansur and White
(2012) and Cicala (2017). Both studies estimate the gains from trade due to expansion
of centralized electricity markets. This paper differs from their work in several important
ways. First, I focus on a context where a market transition does not involve any boundary
change. This setting helps rule out the possibility that trading is impeded by administra-
tive barriers across markets other than imperfect information related to network externality.
Second, to the best of my knowledge, this is the first paper examining the environmental
consequences of electricity market design. As my results suggest, these environmental im-
pacts are critical for welfare evaluation. Third, I use an econometric approach that allows
for considerable flexibility and requires no explicit assumptions on firm behavior or the
grid. This is in contrast with Mansur and White (2012) which assumes away the presence
of market power in their framework. Finally, my study provides a more nuanced under-
standing of the heterogeneous effects of market design across both generators and demand
levels.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.2 presents an overview of the
US electricity market. Section 1.3 provides an example to illustrate how network exter-
nality, information aggregation, and market power can impact market efficiency. Section
1.4 discusses the data while Section 1.5 presents my empirical strategy. In Section 1.6, I
present my findings. I provide a discussion of the results in Section 1.7 and conclude in
Section 1.8.
1.2 Background
In this section, I provide a brief overview of the features of the electricity market which
necessitate the adoption of independent system operators. I also discuss the market design
of this industry including the role of independent system operators under different organi-
zational forms. Given this background, I then introduce the event this study focuses on – a
redesign of the Texas electricity market.
1.2.1 Basics of the Electricity Market
Compared to other commodities, electricity has several unique characteristics. First, the
demand for electricity varies widely from hour to hour and day to day, but is almost per-
fectly inelastic in the short-run. That is, very few consumers are willing to or able to adjust
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their consumption in response to fluctuation in wholesale electricity prices. Second, elec-
tricity cannot be stored in meaningful quantities. This requires a constant real-time balance
between electricity generation and consumption. Sufficient imbalances between the two
can cause brownouts (a drop in electrical frequency) or blackouts (complete loss of elec-
trical service). Third, unlike railroad networks where a supplier can designate a path for
delivery, electric power flows through transmission networks according to physical laws
(Kirchhoff’s Laws) rather than the laws of financial contracting. Finally, the entire trans-
mission network must meet certain physical constraints regarding frequency, voltage and
capacity to ensure grid reliability.
Because of the above attributes, the proper functioning of the electricity market calls
for coordination among market participants. In the US, the entire electricity market is seg-
mented into smaller power control areas.3 Within each power control area, an entity known
as the “balancing authority” ensures both the load-generation balance and the reliability of
the grid. Traditionally, vertically integrated utilities fulfill the role of balancing authorities.
They own both generation and transmission assets, and hence can rely on internal schedul-
ing and dispatch to deliver power within their exclusive service territories. While power
exchanges do take place among utilities, these transactions are usually based upon mutual
agreement, with each utility maintaining control over the use of its own transmission facil-
ities.
However, since the late 1990s, several states have restructured their electric sectors
and opened wholesale markets to competition. Investor-owned utilities were required to
functionally unbundle their wholesale generation assets from their transmission services.
To ensure open and non-discriminatory access to transmission services, FERC order 888
suggested adopting Independent System Operators (ISOs) as the balancing authorities for
these restructured markets. Several ISOs emerged as a result, including the California ISO,
PJM Interconnection, New York ISO, and New England ISO. These ISOs do not own any
transmission assets, but exert functional control over their respective regional markets. Cur-
rently, there are 9 ISOs operating in North America, as shown in Figure 1.1.4
3A power control area (PCA) is a portion of an integrated power grid for which a single dispatcher has
operational control of all electric generators. PCAs range in size from small municipal utilities such as the
City of Columbia, MO, to large power pools such as PJM Interconnection. Generation and transmission
facilities are physically interconnected throughout the grid, but controlled by each PCA. Since the operations
of these facilities have an impact on facilities in remote control areas, the US electric industry has developed
a complex set of standard operating protocols through the National Electric Reliability Council (NERC) and
its eight regional reliability councils.
4Here, I consider ISO and RTO (Regional Transmission Organization) as synonyms.
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Source: ISO/RTO Council
Figure 1.1: ISOs Operating in North America
1.2.2 Market Design of the Wholesale Electricity Market
Although the organization of each wholesale electricity market is different, the various mar-
kets can be broadly categorized into two types based on the scope of the ISO’s authority
and the extent of the market’s centralization.
The first market design is referred to as the bilateral trading market or Min-ISO. Under
the bilateral trading scheme, the role of the ISO is limited and relatively passive (Joskow,
2000). In this market, electricity buyers and sellers engage in private negotiation. The
resulting bilaterally-arranged schedules are reported to the ISO. The ISO evaluates grid re-
liability and mitigates any energy imbalance between scheduled generation and real-time
demand. This model assumes that most of the resource allocation work is done via bilateral
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trading, with the ISO playing only a residual balancing role. This model has been adopted
by MISO (2001-2005), ERCOT (2002-2010) and CAISO (2001-2009) in the US, and NE-
TA in the UK (2001-current).
The second market design is the centralized auction market, usually called the “elec-
tricity pool” or Max-ISO. Under this model, the ISO plays a much more active role in
managing the energy market. Generation resources submit bids to supply energy to the
market. The ISO then applies an optimization algorithm to the portfolio of supply offers
and find the allocation with the lowest bid-based cost to achieve balance between supply
and demand at every node on the network. This model has been adopted by the northeastern
ISOs (NYISO, ISO-NE, PJM), MISO (2005-current), ERCOT (2010-current) and CAISO
(2009-current).
1.2.3 The ERCOT Redesign
The Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT) is a nonprofit corporation certified by
the Public Utility Commission of Texas (PUCT) as the independent system operator for
the ERCOT region.5 ERCOT serves 85 percent of Texas’ load, 75 percent of Texas’ land,
and approximately 23 million customers. ERCOT is unique in that it is one of the three
interconnections in North America. Limited power exchanges occur between ERCOT and
neighboring regions, making it an isolated “electricity island” and thus well suited for the
purposes of this study.6
On December 1, 2010, after years of planing, ERCOT transitioned from a bilateral
trading market to a centralized auction market.7 This transition entailed transferring most
5ERCOT was initially formed in 1970 to comply with NERC requirements. In 1995, the Texas Legislature
amended the Public Utility Regulatory Act to deregulate the wholesale generation market, and later in 1999
passed Senate Bill 7 (SB7) to deregulate the retail electric market. Afterwards, PUCT began the process of
expanding ERCOT’s responsibilities to enable wholesale and retail competition and facilitate efficient use of
the power grid by all market participants. On July 31, 2001, ERCOT began to operate as a single balancing
authority for the entire ERCOT market, fulfilling the requirements of an ISO as specified in FERC Order 888.
6ERCOT is not synchronously connected to the Eastern and Western Interconnections. Power can be ex-
changed only via DC-ties between ERCOT and surrounding regions. There are two commercially operational
DC-Ties between ERCOT and the Eastern Interconnection: North (DC N) located near Oklaunion and East
(DC E) located near Monticello. These DC-Ties are capable of transferring a maximum power of 220 and
600 megawatts respectively. There are three additional DC-Ties connecting ERCOT and Mexico. There are
no DC-Ties between ERCOT and the Western Interconnection. The overall net interchange accounts for only
0.65 percent of total net generation as of 2010.
7The redesign of the market was directed by PUCT in September 2003 with the goal of improving market
and operating efficiencies. The initial implementation date was October 1, 2006. However, due to cost
overruns and software problems, the market transition was postponed several times. The new market was
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of the scheduling and dispatch responsibility from individual firms to ERCOT. Firms can
rely entirely on the markets organized by ERCOT to sell and buy energy. In Appendix
A, I provide more details about the scheduling and dispatch procedures under each market
design.
1.3 Network Externality, Information Aggregation and Mar-
ket Power
It may not be immediately clear which market scheme will produce a more efficient out-
come. In this section, I examine the theoretical predictions regarding market organization
and efficiency, and find that the result is indeed ambiguous. Using a simple example, I first
illustrate the concept of network externality, a special form of externality in the electricity
market. Then I examine how a centralized auction market can solve this externality prob-
lem and thus improve market efficiency. Finally, I show that a centralized auction market
may also reduce efficiency if market power is taken into account.
1.3.1 Network Externality
As mentioned in Section 2, electricity is transmitted through an interconnected network
that is subject to transmission constraints. In particular, networks can become congested.
Once a network is congested, the amount of electricity that can be accommodated by the
network from a particular source may depend on how much electricity is generated by oth-
er sources. This creates a special externality problem in the electricity market. Market
efficiency may be impaired if market participants fail to internalize this externality.
The network externality problem can be illustrated with a simple example. Consider
an equilateral triangular network with three generators. These three generators are located
at the vertices, A, B and C respectively, with different marginal costs, as shown in Fig-
ure 1.2.a. All three transmission lines are identical, except that the line between A and B
has a capacity limit of 100 megawatts. At point C, there is also a demand of 300 megawatts.
To meet the demand at C, the most efficient allocation is to obtain 300 megawatts from
generator A, the least costly generator. The actual flow is guided by Kirchhoff’s Law which
states that when there are multiple paths connecting the same orientation and destination,
finally launched on December 1, 2010.
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electrons will flow along the least resistant route.8 Since there are two routes connecting A
and C, and one of them is twice as long as the other one, the resistance of the indirect path
is twice as high as the resistance of the direct path. Thus, electrons will be split in a 1:2
ratio between the indirect and direct path. Figure 1.2.a depicts the resulting electrical flows.
Now imagine that the demand at C is increased to 600 megawatts. At this point, the
transmission line between A and B reaches its capacity limit. If generator A simply pro-
duces more electricity, some of the additional electrons will naturally flow between A and
B, causing damages to the transmission line and thus reliability issues. Therefore, we must
look for an alternative allocation to fulfill the increasing demand.9 An obvious solution
is to obtain additional 300 megawatts from generator C, the second least costly generator,
which yields a total generation cost of $3900. Figure 1.2.b illustrates this situation, which
I refer to as the “naive allocation”.
While at first glance this seems to be the best solution, the naive allocation is actually
not the most efficient because it overlooks potential complementarities among generation
sources in the network. Suppose we have generator B provide 150 megawatts. This at first
seems to be an inefficient arrangement, since B is the most expensive generator. But gener-
ation from B alters the resistance of the indirect path from A to C. Thus, it enables greater
flow from generator A through the direct path between A and C without adding extra flow
through the congested path between A and B.10 Figure 1.2.c illustrates the resulting alloca-
tion. The total generation cost is $3600, which is lower than the generation cost under the
naive allocation.
8The exact statement of Kirchhoff’s (voltage) law is that the directed sum of the voltage around any
closed network is zero. By Ohm’s law, voltage is proportional to current for the same electrical circuit. Let
the currents going through line AB, BC and AC be IAB, IBC and IAC, respectively. Then the combination
of Kirchhoff’s law and Ohm’s law dictates the following relationship: IAB+IBC-IAC=0. Under scenario (a),
IAB=IBC= 12 IAC.
9One may wonder why we do not close down the link between A and B so that power can flow directly
to consumers at C. Transmission lines like this are typically built for reliability reasons. For example, in
case one path fails, the other provides an alternative to deliver supplies. Although transmission lines can
be disconnected from the grid through a “disconnecter” or a “circuit breaker,” these options are usually not
intended for normal control of the circuit, but only for protection during service or safety isolation during
maintenance.
10Recall that in footnote 8, we have IAB+IBC-IAC=0. This means that we can have a higher IAC by increas-
ing IBC with the same IAB.
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Notes: These figures provide an example illustrating the notion of network externality. Figure (a) shows the
optimal allocation when demand is 300 megawatts. Figures (b) and (c) show the “naive allocation” and the
optimal allocation respectively when demand is 600 megawatts. See the text for details.
Figure 1.2: An Example Illustrating Congestion Externalities
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Notes: These figures provide an example illustrating the effect of market power. Figure (a) shows the market
structure. Firm X has two plants located at nodes B and C. Competitive suppliers are located at nodes A
and C. The supply curve of the competitive fringe at node C is given in Figure (b). The power flows drawn
in Figure (a) indicate the efficient allocation when Firm X acts competitively and marginal costs are used to
minimize the generation cost. Figure (c) presents the outcome when Firm X exercises its unilateral market
power. See the text for details.
Figure 1.3: An Example Illustrating Market Power
11
1.3.2 Imperfect Information and Information Aggregation
The above example shows that finding the most efficient allocation requires knowing the
marginal costs of the generators and the structure of the network, as well as being able to
calculate electric flows over every segment of the transmission network.
Under a bilateral trading market, market participants possess imperfect information that
prevents them from identifying network externalities and achieving efficient allocation-
s. Although they may have a good idea of different generators’ marginal costs given the
similarity of the technology and the abundance of public data, they may not know others’
scheduled generation since these are privately negotiated. Moreover, the actual transmis-
sion network has hundreds of lines with thousands of nodes. This complexity adds to the
difficulty of identifying externalities. While it seems that market participants may learn
gradually through repeated interactions, it is an illusion created by the simplicity of the
network in the example. Identifying externalities in a complex network requires detailed
modeling of the grid and considerable computing power. As a result, the externality prob-
lem cannot be resolved in a Coasian fashion under a bilateral trading market.11
By contrast, under a centralized auction market, the ISO aggregates information from
generators and takes full charge of scheduling. The optimization algorithm directly takes
into account the physical properties of the actual transmission lines and solves for the op-
timal generation allocation that minimizes bid-based generation costs over the entire net-
work. Since network externalities are directly accounted for in the optimization procedure,
the centralized market is superior at resolving the problem. Mansur and White (2012) share
the same view on the source of efficiency gain.
1.3.3 Market Power
In the previous example, I assume that marginal costs are observed and used to determine
economic dispatch. Since the ability of the ISO to optimize allocations depends on the
11Although ERCOT can re-dispatch generators in the balancing market, the adjustments do not fully correct
inefficiency in the bilateral schedules, for several reasons. First, the balancing market only takes care of the
imbalance between scheduled generation and demand, which is about only 5% of the overall generation,
while the majority are scheduled by market participants. Second, if a bilateral schedule is feasible and
yet inefficient, such as the “naive allocation” in the example, ERCOT will not change it in the balancing
market. Finally, when ERCOT does change the schedules to resolve power imbalance or congestion, it
adjusts generation in a piecemeal fashion, as explained in Appendix A. Using a zonal structure rather than
considering the grid in its entirety, ERCOT cannot find the most efficient allocation in its adjustment.
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information submitted by suppliers, inefficiency can result when firms deliberately with-
hold their generation capacity or submit bids substantially in excess of their marginal costs.
Such behavior changes the dispatch order on the supple curve and causes high-cost gener-
ators to be used while low-cost ones stay idle.12 Evidence of such manipulation has been
found in the UK and California markets by Wolak and Patrick (2001) and Joskow and Kahn
(2002), respectively.
To see how the exercise of market power reduces efficiency, consider an extended ver-
sion of the previous example. As shown in Figure 1.3.a, there is a mass of competitive
suppliers located at node A with a constant marginal cost of $5. A competitive fringe sup-
plier sits at node C with the marginal cost curve indicated in Figure 1.3.b. In addition, Firm
X owns two generating units, one at node B and another at node C, with marginal costs of
$9 and $7.2, respectively. In this example, the competitive suppliers take the strategies of
Firm X as given and act as price takers.
Under this setup, the most efficient allocation remains unchanged: we should procure
450 megawatts from suppliers at A and 150 megawatts from Firm X at B. This will be the
resulting allocation in a centralized auction market when marginal costs are submitted as
bids, or equivalently firm X is acting competitively. The equilibrium price at point B is $9
and the profit of Firm X is $0.
However, suppose Firm X wishes to take advantage of its unique position in the con-
gested network to increase its profit. If it withholds one megawatt at B, this means two
additional megawatts must be generated at C, increasing prices at both B and C. In this
case, Firm X has to make a classic tradeoff between profiting from a higher quantity versus
a higher price. Assume Firm X uses the quantities it supplies as leverage. At the optimum,
Firm X should supply 100 megawatts at point B, and 0 megawatts at point C, leaving the
competitive fringe firm to meet the remaining demand, as depicted in Figure 1.3.c.13. The
equilibrium prices at point B and C are $13 and $9, respectively, and Firm X’s profit is
$400.14 Relative to the competitive benchmark, Firm X is able to increase its profit by
restricting its output, but the resulting allocation is no longer efficient. The total generation
12Note that the exploitation of market power does not necessarily indicate efficiency loss. If all firms
simply bid twice their marginal costs, they will retain their order in the supply curve and hence incur no
efficiency loss, despite the oligopoly rents they will enjoy. Under this scenario, the exercise of market power
only causes a transfer of surplus from consumers to suppliers.
13See Appendix B for details.
14The outcome will be the same if I assume Firm X competes by bidding into the pool. The optimal
strategy then is to bid $13 and $9 for units at B and C, respectively.
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cost becomes $3750, which is higher than not only the cost under the efficient allocation,
but also the cost under the naive allocation.15
This example shows that the exercise of market power can significantly affect genera-
tion allocation. Therefore, whether a centralized market improves efficiency is an empirical
question, depending on changes in both the management of network externality and the ex-
ercise of market power.16 In the next sections, I will take advantage of ERCOT’s market
redesign to empirically examine the efficiency effect.
1.4 Data
For this study, I compiled a detailed and comprehensive dataset from a variety of sources.
Most of the data are publicly-available. The sample period runs from June 1, 2010 to
August 31, 2011, covering 6 months before the redesign and 9 months after the redesign.17
1.4.1 Generation Data
The primary data I use to determine electricity generation are from ERCOT. For each gen-
erating unit under ERCOT’s control, I observe the net electrical output in 15-minute inter-
vals.18 I aggregate net generation at the hourly level to be consistent with the other data
I have. Note that my sample is missing several days of data immediately following the
market redesign, due to glitches experienced by ERCOT in that period, but is otherwise
complete. Overall, there are 429 units, at 218 power plants, supplying electricity to the grid
15Recall that the naive allocation is the allocation when marginal costs are known but complementarity
among generation sources is not taken into account. In this case, the naive allocation will procure 300
megawatts from A and 300 megawatts from Firm X at point C. The resulting generation cost for the naive
allocation is $3660.
16It would be interesting to directly compare market power under the two markets. Although data exist
for bids submitted in centralized auction markets, price and quantity data on bilateral contracts are rarely
available due to the confidential nature of these transactions. As a result, the existing literature remains silent
on the market power issue in the bilateral trading setting.
17I exclude dates between February 2, 2011 to February 5, 2011. During this period, a strong arctic front
approached Texas and resulted in the lowest temperature in 20 years. According to EIA’s 2009 Residential
Energy Consumption Survey, about half of Texas residents use electricity for heating. The extreme weather
conditions drove up the demand for electricity. At the same time, the extreme cold also affected generation
performance. More than 8,000 MW of generation unexpectedly dropped off line (40% are coal generators).
The combination of these factors led to rotating outages on the ERCOT grid.
18A generating unit is a single turbine along with a boiler and a smokestack. A power plant usually consists
of several, independently operating generating units. For combined cycle natural gas generators, however,
the output decision is made jointly for both the combustion turbine and the steam turbine. Therefore, I treat
them as one single unit.
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managed by ERCOT.19
To determine ERCOT’s generation portfolio, I supplement ERCOT’s generation data
with EIA’s Annual Electric Generator Report (EIA-860 form) and Power Plant Operation
Report (EIA-923 form). Table 1.1 describes the share of ERCOT’s annual generation quan-
tity and capacity by fuel type. Electricity generation in ERCOT comes almost entirely from
coal, natural gas, nuclear and wind, with the rest comprising only 1% of the total genera-
tion.
Fuel Type Share of Capacity(%) Share of Generation(%)
2010 2011 2010 2011
Coal 19.95 20.34 35.15 35.61
Hydroelectric 0.58 0.55 0.28 0.15
Natural Gas 64.36 63.55 44.59 44.60
Combined Cycle 37.99 39.17 38.00 37.97
Combustion Turbine 7.13 7.06 3.52 3.72
Steam Turbine 19.24 17.32 3.07 2.91
Nuclear 5.17 5.27 12.08 10.96
Wind 9.45 9.79 6.90 7.71
Others20 0.49 0.50 1.00 0.97
Notes: This table reports the share of capacity and the share of generation quantity for
different resource types in 2010 and 2011. Data come from EIA-860 forms and EIA-923
forms.
Table 1.1: Generation Composition in ERCOT: 2010-2011
1.4.2 Generator Characteristics
I obtain plant- and generator-level characteristics from EIA-860 forms, EPA’s Continuous
Emissions Monitoring System (CEMS) and eGrid.21 For each generating unit, I observe its
ownership, nameplate capacity, fuel type, technology, sector, commercial operating date,
19Not all the generating units in the ERCOT territory are subject to ERCOT dispatch. There are firms
which provide electricity only on private networks. Nor are all the generating units dispatched by ERCOT
located in Texas. In particular, the Kiamichi Energy Facility is located in Oklahoma.
For subsequent analysis, I also drop generators whose cumulative generation is less than 15 megawatt
hours during the sample period. These units are not economically important.
20Others include biomass, petroleum coke, distillate fuel oil, solar and electricity storage.
21All fossil-fuel generating units with at least 25 megawatts of generating capacity have to report their
hourly gross generation, heat inputs, and CO2, SO2, and NOx emissions to the EPA. In the sample, 218 out
of 300 thermal generators are covered by CEMS.
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operating status and location, among other information. For generators with information
available in CEMS, I also observe their hourly CO2, SO2 and NOx emission quantities and
heat inputs.
For thermal generators, I use these data to measure the average CO2, SO2 and NOx
emission rates and heat rates. Heat rate is the ratio of thermal energy input against electric-
ity output. It is stable within the operating range of a generator, but can be higher during
startups.22Heat rate reflects power plant’s efficiency: the lower the heat rate is, the more
efficient a generator is. For generators covered in CEMS, I estimate the average heat rate
for each unit by using the slope of regressions of heat inputs (in MMBtus) on net gen-
eration (in MWhs). For generators not covered in CEMS, I use their plant-level nominal
heat rates obtained from the EPA’s eGrid database. To calculate average emission rates, I
divide total emission quantities (in short tons or pounds) by total net generation (in MWhs).
Coal Natural Gas
Combined Cycle Combustion Turbine Steam Turbine
Nameplate Capacity(MW) 638.61 414.79 72.53 254.10
(192.96) (277.91) (44.13) (215.74)
Years in Operation 26.00 16.15 19.50 43.64
(11.38) (11.11) (12.63) (8.08)
Heat Rate(MMBtu/MWh) 9.55 7.38 11.90 10.99
(0.62) (1.35) (4.26) (2.82)
CO2(Ton/MWh) 1.16 0.51 0.72 0.80
(0.20) (0.13) (0.29) (0.33)
SO2(Pound/MWh) 5.80 0.01 0.03 0.02
(3.86) (0.02) (0.05) (0.03)
NOx(Pound/MWh) 1.36 0.34 2.24 1.76
(0.69) (0.26) (2.61) (1.06)
Median Ramping Time23 Over 12H 12H 1H 12H
Notes: This table compares the characteristics of different types of thermal generators. The data for nameplate capacity,
years in operation, and ramping time come from EIA-860 forms. The heat rates and emission rates are calculated by the
author as described in the text. Standard deviations are reported in the parentheses.
Table 1.2: Summary Statistics of Thermal Generators’ Characteristics
Table 1.2 presents the summary statistics for the thermal generators in my sample. In
general, coal generators tend to be larger, more polluting and slower in ramping than natu-
22More than half of the startup costs are fuel costs incurred in warming up the generator. The startup cost
varies by technology and unit size.
23Ramping time is defined as the minimum amount of time required to bring a generator from cold shut-
down to full load, and is coded into four categories: 10 minutes, 1 hour, 12 hours and over 12 hours. I obtain
this information from the 2013 EIA-860 form, since it is available only after 2013.
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ral gas generators. Natural gas generators use several different technologies. A combustion
turbine, a.k.a. gas turbine, uses high-pressure gas generated from fuel-burning to drive the
turbine. A steam turbine works similarly except it uses water instead of air to drive the
turbine. Most steam turbine generators currently in use were built in the 1980s and 1990s.
The technology has not seen much improvement since then. By contrast, combustion tur-
bine technology has become more efficient over time. As a result, there is a wide variation
in the heat rates of combustion turbines. The heat rate of the most recent turbine is only
one fourth of that of the oldest one. Besides, combustion turbines can also respond quickly
to changing demand. Therefore, they are often used as peaking plants. The relatively new
combined-cycle technology combines these two thermodynamic cycles together to improve
the efficiency of energy conversion. As a result, they have the smallest average heat rate
among natural gas generators.
1.4.3 Electricity Demand
The hourly demand data at eight weather zones are obtained from ERCOT.24 The data is
derived by aggregating meter data and includes both transmission and distribution losses. I
use demand at the weather zone level to capture any spatial distribution in demand that may
impact generation outcomes. In addition, I select a time period that includes both winter
and summer months under each market design to capture any seasonal or diurnal patterns
in demand.
1.4.4 Cost Data
The cost structure in the electricity industry is relatively straightforward and well under-
stood. For wind generators, the marginal cost for producing 1 more MW is essentially
zero. For nuclear power plants, the marginal cost can be estimated by adding up the fuel
cost and the variable operating and maintenance cost. I use the EIA (2011)’s fuel cost es-
timate of $7.01 and ERCOT (2012)’s VOM estimate of $5.02 to obtain a marginal cost of
$12.03 for nuclear units. To estimate the marginal cost for thermal generators, I take the
standard approach commonly used in the economic literature (Wolfram (1999), Borenstein
et al (2002), Mansur (2008)). This methodology is based on the following elements: (1)
the heat rate of each generator, (2) fuel prices, (3) variable operating and maintenance costs
24A weather zone is a geographic region designated by ERCOT in which climatological characteristics are
similar for all areas within such a region. There are eight weather zones: coast, west, far west, east, north,
north central, southern and south central.
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(VOM), (4) the emission rates of each generator, and (5) emission allowance prices. Ap-
pendix C provides more details on the data sources of elements (2), (3) and (5). For each
thermal generator i at time t, its marginal cost is calculated using the following formula:
MCit=Heat Ratei×Fuel Priceit+Pnoxt×NOxi+Pso2t×SO2i+VOMi
Figure 1.4 plots the marginal cost curve using generators’ average marginal costs and the
observed maximum hourly net generation as a measure of their capacity during the sample
period. Note that marginal costs differ by fuel and technology types. Specifically, wind
generation and nuclear power generation are cheaper than thermal generation. Among
thermal generators, coal generation is in general cheaper than natural gas generation, and
combined-cycle generation is cheaper than combustion or steam generation. I also over-
lay on the same graph the distribution of hourly electricity demand. We can see that the
marginal unit is a coal or a combined-cycle natural gas generator for most realizations of
demand, while during peak hours it is a combustion or a steam turbine.
Notes: This figure plots the marginal cost curve using generators’ average marginal costs and observed max-
imum hourly net generation as their capacity for the sample period (June 1, 2010 - August 31, 2011). It also
shows the kernel density of the total hourly electricity demand for the same period. See the text for details.
Figure 1.4: Marginal Cost Curve and Distribution of Demand
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1.5 Empirical Strategy
In this section, I introduce the econometric approach I use to quantify the changes in gen-
eration allocation due to the market redesign. I begin by discussing how market efficiency
is measured in electricity generation.
Figure 1.5 illustrates a hypothetical efficiency change. Following the literature, I treat
electricity demand as perfectly inelastic in the short-run. Demand swings are driven entire-
ly by exogenous forces, such as temperature or human activity. Given the need to balance
generation with demand at every second, there is no inefficiency from quantity distortion
under either market design. Thus, any change in market efficiency will be reflected as a
change in the generation cost needed to serve the same demand. The MC curve in the
graph represents the theoretical efficient supply based on installed generator capacity and
each generator’s marginal cost. However, the actual supply will deviate from this curve.
A generator operates out of the “merit order” if it is called on to help meet n megawatts
of demand even though it is not the n cheapest megawatts in terms of installed capacity.
Out-of-merit cost is measured as the additional production cost relative to the cost of dis-
patching the cheapest units. In Figure 1.5, the grey area represents out-of-merit costs under
the bilateral trading market. An electricity market may incur out-of-merit costs for a num-
ber of reasons. First, transmission constraints may make it infeasible to utilize only the
least-costly units.25 Second, market participants may fail to identify and resolve network
externalities. Third, they may also influence the market by exercising market power, as
explained in Section 1.3. In my study, I do not focus on out-of-merit costs per se, as does
Borenstein et al (2002). Instead, I focus on the difference in out-of-merit costs between
the two different designs. In Figure 1.5, the centralized market brings the supply closer
to the MC curve, reducing out-of-merit costs. Correspondingly, the slashed-pattern area
measures the efficiency gain in this hypothetical example.
In order to measure the changes in generation costs, I need to create a credible coun-
terfactual of what the outcome would be had ERCOT not redesigned its market. Creating
this counterfactual poses several challenges. First, a market simulation with an engineering
model would require modeling the electrical grid in detail and making strong assumptions
25Other reasons include generator outages and dynamic constraints. Plants periodically go off-line for
maintenance and occasionally experience forced shutdowns, causing more expensive units to fill the gap.
In addition, the start-up time and ramping costs play a role in determining the most economical dispatch,
as shown by Mansur (2008) and Reguant (2014). Hence, the mere presence of out-of-merit costs does not
necessarily indicate efficiency loss.
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Figure 1.5: An Illustration of A Hypothetical Efficiency Gain Under the Centralized Market
regarding firms’ information sets and strategic behavior. This is a difficult task given the
complex nature of the transmission network as well as the competitive dynamics. Sec-
ond, doing a pre/post comparison of generation costs might seem plausible as there are
few changes in the market during the relatively short period preceding and following the
redesign. Indeed, in Appendix D, I show that the ranges of demand levels and fuel prices
are comparable pre- and post-redesign, and there is no major change in market capacity
during the sample period. However, demand levels and fuel prices fluctuate even within
a very short window of time. Hence, the distribution may vary over time. In particular,
during my sample period, the average demand post-redesign is lower than the average de-
mand pre-redesign. Without taking these changes into account, I may misattribute a cost
reduction due to demand shifts as an indication of an effect of the market redesign.
I therefore rely on an econometric approach that estimates a flexible function of gener-
ation quantity on market demand and fuel prices for each generating unit separately before
and after the market redesign. I then use these estimates to construct counterfactual gen-
eration quantities which form the basis for the calculation of changes in overall generation
costs and emissions. The idea is that if the centralized market results in an improvement
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in market efficiency, we should in general expect an increase in electricity generation from
lower-cost generators and a decrease in electricity generation from higher-cost generators,
conditional on the same market demand and fuel prices. Figure 1.6 illustrates this situa-
tion. Hence, we can measure the change in generation quantity for each generator by first
estimating these generation curves. This approach is similar to the one used by Davis and
Hausman (2016).
Notes: Assuming constant fuel prices, this figure provides an example of changes in generation curves for
generators of low versus high costs if the centralized market improves efficiency.
Figure 1.6: An Illustration of Changes in Generation Curves for Generators of Different
Costs
I treat wind power and nuclear power as non-dispatchable units unaffected by the mar-
ket redesign. For wind generators, generation quantity is largely determined by the avail-
ability of the wind, but it may be curtailed by ERCOT when transmission is congested.
Although the market redesign can potentially improve the integration of wind power and
thus reduce the incidence of curtailments, I do not find evidence supporting such a claim.26
For nuclear power generators, given its low marginal costs and limited capacity to follow
26See Appendix E for more details.
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load, they almost always run at full capacity unless having an outage. Based on the above
reasons, the rest of my analysis will focus on only thermal generators.
Let ThermalDemand jt be the residual demand for thermal generators after subtracting
supply from wind, nuclear and other sources at weather zone j in time t.27 I then separate
ThermalDemand at each zone into 12 mutually exclusive equal-frequency bins.28 Let b jk
(j=1,...,8; k=1,...,12) denote the left end point of bin k for demand in weather zone j . Define
B jk(ThermalDemand jt) =
ThermalDemand jt −b jk if ThermalDemand jt > b jk0 if ThermalDemand jt ≤ b jk
For each thermal generator i, I estimate a continuous piecewise linear model with re-
spect to demand at each weather zone for the pre- and post-redesign periods respectively:





βi jkB jk(ThermalDemand jt)+φih +δiw +α1iPNg−Coal,t +α2iP2Ng−Coal,t +εit
(1.1)
I also include hour fixed effects φih and day-of-week fixed effects δiw, as well as a
quadratic form of the price difference between coal and natural gas to control for the effect
of fuel prices on the switch between coal and natural gas generation.29 All of the coeffi-
cients are generator specific, and different before and after the market transition. Overall,
there are 10,646 hourly observations in my sample. For each generator, I estimate 256 coef-
ficients, resulting in a total of 76,032 coefficients for the 297 generating units in the sample.
To form my counterfactual, I use the estimates from the pre-redesign period and calculate
the change in generation quantity for each generator i at each hour t in the post-redesign
period. In the mathematical form,
∆Genit = ( ˆGenit | θ̂i
post
,Xpostt )− ( ˆGenit | θ̂i
pre
,Xpostt )
27Others include biomass, petroleum coke, distillate fuel oil, solar and electricity storage.
28The optimal number of bins is selected by using the leave-one-out cross validation technique. Specifical-
ly, given the number of bins, I estimate the corresponding model on (N-1) observations (hours) and predict
the outcomes for the remaining one. I repeat the process for all N combinations and calculate the prediction
errors. I experiment with different numbers of bins and choose the one that minimizes the mean squared
error.
29Including higher-order polynomials of the fuel price difference yields similar results. I also perform
ridge regressions as an alternative specification to address overfitting concern. The results are quantitatively
similar.
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The standard errors are estimated using the simple block wild bootstrapping method
where a “block” consists of 24 hours of a calendar day. This method allows for arbitrary
correlations across generators as well as serial correlations up to 24 hours.
1.6 Results
1.6.1 Effect of the Market Redesign on Generation Quantity
In this section, I first present the estimated average hourly changes in generation quantity
and then examine how the changes in generation vary with changes in demand and fuel
prices. In light of the heterogeneity of costs across generators, I aggregate the results ac-
cording to their fuel and technology types.
Table 1.3 reports the estimated changes in generation quantity averaged over all hours
in the post-redesign period. The baseline column shows the results from the estimation
of equation (1.1). On average, coal generation increases by 511.2 MWh per hour while
natural gas generation decreases by a similar amount. This finding suggests that the cen-
tralized market makes use of lower-cost resources more than the bilateral trading market.
To provide more perspective on the magnitude of this change, the overall coal generating
capacity in ERCOT is 19,819 MW. Therefore, the increase in coal generation is roughly
a 3% increase in the utilization of overall coal capacity. Within natural gas generators,
the decrease in generation comes from both combined-cycle and steam-turbine generators.
Interestingly, combustion turbine generators experience an increase in production after the
redesign, although they do not have the lowest marginal costs. This increasing usage can
be explained by their ability to adjust production quickly to serve peak loads. I will discuss
a more nuanced picture of these changes later.
In addition, I run several alternative specifications to check the robustness of my result-
s. First, since ambient temperature may affect thermal generators’ efficiency, I re-run my
analysis including a quadratic form of temperature in model (1).30 Second, generators dif-
fer in their ability to adjust output in response to load fluctuations. To capture this dynamic
constraint, I include the daily variance of demand and one-hour lagged demand in models
(2) and (3), respectively. Third, in model (4), I experiment with a higher order polynomial
of the fuel price gap. Finally, in model (5), I truncate the predictions that are either below
30Temperature data are collected from National Centers for Environmental Information (NCEI)’s Integrat-
ed Surface Database. I use the average hourly temperature of the three largest cities in Texas, i.e., Houston,
Dallas, and San Antonio.
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Fuel Type Baseline Model Alternative Models
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Coal 511.2 524.2 508.2 509.1 554.9 480.4
(71.2) (68.6) (75.6) (73.5) (70.8) (71.5)
Natural Gas: CC -353.4 -350.2 -352.7 -357.2 -362.4 -423.7
(57.8) (57.8) (60.6) (60.0) (54.7) (55.0)
Natural Gas: CT 106.8 86.5 106.2 113.6 115.6 95.7
(15.4) (13.6) (15.2) (16.0) (16.5) (15.3)
Natural Gas: ST -306.3 -301.1 -303.3 -314.8 -281.9 -346.1
(29.8) (30.0) (28.9) (31.2) (29.9) (27.4)
Quadratic Fuel Price Difference Y Y Y Y N Y
Quartic Fuel Price Difference N N N N Y N
Quadratic Temperature N Y N N N N
Standard Deviation of Demand N N Y N N N
One-hour Lagged Demand N N N Y N N
Truncation N N N N N Y
Notes: This table reports the estimates of the average hourly changes in generation quantities measured in MWh, using
equation (1.1) and several alternative models. For all models, hour and day-of-week fixed effects are included. The sample
consists of 10,464 hourly observations and 297 generating units. Standard errors reported in the parentheses are estimated
using the simple block wild bootstrapping method.
Table 1.3: Effect of the Market Redesign on Average Generation Quantities
zero or beyond the generators’ nameplate capacities. Note that while about 25% of the pre-
dictions are truncated, only 5% of these are more than 5 MWh away from the thresholds.
The results from these alternative specifications are reported in Table 1.3. Although the
magnitudes differ slightly, the overall pattern from each alternative specification is consis-
tent with my baseline results. In addition, in Appendix D, I perform two placebo tests and
find that these changes are not observed in other years when there is no market redesign.
Next, I examine how the average hourly change in generation quantity varies with de-
mand levels, assuming average post-redesign fuel prices. Figure 1.7 plots the changes for
different fuel and technology types. For coal generation, the increase persists across all
demand levels, but tends to be larger when demand is higher. Note that the increase is
also larger when thermal demand is at about 20,000 MWh, the point at which coal and
combined-cycle natural gas split on the marginal cost curve. The results show that the
decrease in combined-cycle natural gas generation also changes with demand. Specifi-
cally, the decrease is greater when demand is relatively low. When demand is high, the
decrease in combined-cycle natural gas generation is insignificant, as this resource is rela-
tively cheaper compared to steam turbines.
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Notes: These figures plot the average hourly changes in generation quantity at different demand levels. The
prices of natural gas and coal are fixed at their post-redesign averages, i.e. $4.17 per MMBtu for natural gas
and $2.17 per MMBtu for coal. The grey area indicates 95% confidence intervals.
Figure 1.7: Average Hourly Changes in Generation Quantity by Demand Levels
For combustion and steam turbines, their changes display interesting patterns. When
demand is low, these two resources are less likely to be used. Consequently, the market
redesign has little effect on their generation levels. However, when demand is high, com-
bustion turbine generation increases and steam turbine generation decreases. The increase
in combustion turbine generation is due to its relatively low marginal costs compared to
steam turbines, as well as its ability to ramp up and down quickly, which allows it to offset
steam turbine generation in those cases when coal or combined-cycle natural gas genera-
tors are unable to. Overall, these results reinforce the role of cost in determining generation
outcomes in the centralized market.
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Notes: This figure shows the hourly changes in generation quantity over the price differences between natural
gas and coal. Demand at each zone is assumed to be at its post-redesign average, which adds up to 31,196
MW for the overall thermal demand. The shaded area indicates 95% confidence intervals.
Figure 1.8: Hourly Changes in Generation Quantity and Fuel Price Differences
Finally, in Figure 1.8, I examine the changes in generation quantity at different fuel
prices, assuming average post-redesign demand levels. Regarding coal generation, the re-
sults indicate an interesting inverse-U shape. As the price gap between coal and natural
gas increases, so does the switch from natural gas to coal generation. However, at a certain
level, this increase in coal generation slows, as market participants can easily identify the
cost advantages of coal at this gap level regardless of market design. As a result, there is
less room for improvement under the centralized market. This pattern is also supported by
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the changes in combined-cycle natural gas generation. With marginal costs close to coal,
combined-cycle generators experience changes in the opposite direction to those of coal. In
contrast, the fuel price difference has a relatively small effect on combustion and steam tur-
bine generation as these generators are further away from coal on the marginal cost curve.
1.6.2 Effect of the Market Redesign on Generation Cost
To calculate the changes in the generation cost due to the market redesign, I use each gen-
erator’s estimated quantity changes from the previous section and their average marginal
costs in the post-redesign period.31 The overall change in generation cost at hour t is the





Averaging across all hours, the cost reduction is estimated to be $5,062 per hour with
a bootstrapped standard error of $1,026 for the nine months in the post-redesign period.
The reduction is roughly 0.5% of the average total hourly generation cost. Although these
changes vary on an hourly basis, the generation cost is estimated to be lower than what
it would have been without the market redesign for about 75% of the time. Figure 1.9
shows the distribution of hourly changes in generation cost for low and high demand hours
separately. In general, we can see that the cost reduction is higher during high demand
hours.
1.6.3 Effect of the Market Redesign on Emissions and External Costs
Although the centralized market leads to a significant reduction in generation costs, it also
affects social welfare through changes in emissions. From a social perspective, any private
31This approach assumes no start-up cost and constant marginal costs. An alternative approach is to run
regressions similar to equation (1.1), but with a different dependent variable – the heat inputs. In this way, I
can capture any nonlinearity in the fuel usage over the operational range of a generator. With the estimated
changes in heat inputs, I can apply the fuel prices to derive the changes in fuel costs. This approach, though,
does not take into account other cost components, such as emission allowance costs and VOM. To address
this issue, I estimate the non-fuel cost changes using the results from the original generation regressions and
the non-fuel portion of each generator’s marginal cost. The resulting estimate for the overall cost reduction
is $8,332 per hour on average for the nine months post redesign. This is higher than the estimate without
start-up costs, as it captures the additional cost saving from increasing generation by combustion turbines
which have the lowest start-up cost. The limitation of this approach is that only generators covered in CEMS
data have heat input information. Thus I must limit the sample to those generators, which comprise about
two thirds of all thermal generators.
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Notes: This figure shows the histograms of the estimated changes in generation cost for hours of low demand
(thermal demand < 40,000 MWh) and hours of high demand (thermal demand > 40,000 MWh). The red
lines indicate the average change in generation cost in each case.
Figure 1.9: Distribution of Estimated Changes in Generation Cost: Low v.s. High Demand
efficiency gain must be weighted against changes in external costs of emissions.
Given the available data, I focus on three pollutants: CO2, SO2 and NOx. To estimate
the change in emissions of each pollutant, I again use the estimated changes in electricity
generation quantity and each generator’s emission rates. For pollutant j, I calculate the
change in emission quantity at hour t as the sum of emission changes from all the genera-
tors, i.e.,
∆Emission Quantity jt =
∑
i
∆Genit ∗Emission Ratei j
The second column in Table 1.4 reports the average hourly changes in emission quan-
tities. On average, CO2 emission increases by 350.5 tons per hour or 1.3 percent. This
rise in CO2 emission is not surprising given the increasing usage of coal generators in the
centralized market. On average, coal power plants emit 1.16 tons of CO2 per MWh, while
natural gas plants emit only 0.65 tons of CO2 per MWh. For SO2 and NOx, I find that
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emissions decrease by 0.268 and 0.239 tons per hour, respectively. Notably, SO2 emissions
decrease despite the fact that coal generators on average emit far more SO2 than natural
gas generators. This decrease is a result of generation changes within coal plants. The SO2
emission rates of coal generators are dispersed, ranging from as low as 0.1 pound/MWh to
as high as 14.8 pound/MWh. This variation is a reflection of heterogeneity in coal power
plants’ compliance strategies with environmental regulations. For example, coal plants can
choose whether to install a scrubber or what kinds of coal to use. As a result, when high
sulfur emitters are displaced by low sulfur emitters within coal generators, the overall SO2
emission levels can decrease. However, this change is not significant, given the relatively
large standard errors.
In a similar way, I obtain the changes in external costs associated with these emission
changes. For pollutant j, the change in the external cost at hour t is calculated as follows:
∆External Cost jt =
∑
i
∆Genit ∗Emission Ratei j ∗Marginal Damagei j
To calculate the monetary value of emissions, I need to select appropriate measures of
marginal damages. For CO2, EPA (2016) compiles estimates on the social cost of carbon
for use in regulatory analysis. For one metric ton of CO2 emission in 2011, the social cost
ranges from $10 to $51 in 2007 dollars depending on the assumed discount rates. I convert
2007 dollars to 2011 dollars to make the values comparable with generation cost estimates.
For SO2 and NOx, I use Jaramillo and Muller (2016)’s marginal damage estimates. Unlike
CO2 which is a uniformly mixed pollutant, SO2 and NOx have relatively localized geo-
graphic impacts. Hence, these estimates are spatially differentiated at the county level. For
SO2, the marginal damage ranges from $7,713.4 to $41,959 per metric ton, while for NOx,
the marginal damage ranges from $1,434.6 to $7,785.2 per metric ton, both in 2011 dollars.
The rightmost column in Table 1.4 reports the average hourly changes in the external
costs of the three pollutants. The external costs of CO2 emissions range from $3,855.5,
to $19,628 per hour depending on the social cost of carbon, while the external costs of
SO2 and NOx emissions are estimated to be $10,847 and $-1,930.5 per hour respective-
ly. Taken together, these results show that the overall change in emission costs exceeds
the private generation cost savings of $5,062 per hour. When interpreting the results, two
caveats should be kept in mind. First, power plants may internalize some of the external
costs due to cap and trade programs. In Texas, while CO2 emissions are not regulated, SO2
and NOx are subject to cap and trade programs. However, this internalization should not
29








SO2 -0.268 7,713.4 - 41,959 10,847
(0.25) (4,949)
NOx -0.239 1,434.6 - 7,785.2 -1,930.5
(0.05) (269.3)
Notes: This table reports the average hourly changes in emission quantities and the associated changes in external costs. Standard errors
reported in the parentheses are estimated using the simple block wild bootstrapping method.
Table 1.4: Average Hourly Changes in Emission Quantities and External Costs
significantly impact my results, since the average allowance prices for SO2 and NOx during
my sample period are just $8.4 and $275.5 per ton respectively, a very small fraction of the
actual damages. A second caveat is that I implicitly assume that any environmental damage
incurred by changes in SO2 and NOx emissions is confined to Texas. That is, no changes in
emission levels are created outside of Texas as a result of this market redesign. However,
if the cap and trade programs are binding, then by constraint, emission increases in Texas
would create emission reductions somewhere outside of Texas, resulting in no aggregate
change in emission levels. Furthermore, even without aggregate changes in emission quan-
tity, the redistribution of the pollutants may still affect overall environmental costs, given
the spatially heterogeneous nature of the marginal damages. A thorough analysis of this
spillover effect is beyond the scope of this paper. Nevertheless, even without considering
the impact of either SO2 or NOx, I find the increase in the external cost of CO2 emissions
itself completely offsets the private efficiency gain, as long as the marginal damage of CO2
is greater than $15 per ton.
1.7 Discussion
The above results show that both the generation cost reduction and the external cost in-
crease are statistically significant and economically large. In this section, I first compare
my results with the predicted savings expected by ERCOT, and then discuss whether the
redesign is warranted on a cost-benefit basis.
Prior to the implementation of the new market design, the Public Utility Commission
of Texas retained several consulting firms, Tabors Caramanis & Associates (TCA) in 2004,
and CRA International, Inc. and Resero Consulting (CRA/Resero) in 2008, to conduct
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cost-benefit analyses of the new market design. These studies use the GE MAPS simu-
lation model that includes a full transmission representation of ERCOT but assumes no
market power. The annual production cost reduction is estimated to be $66.8 million and
$48.0 million in 2008 dollars, respectively. Furthermore, a back-cast using bids submit-
ted during a market trial suggests that the 2008 production cost would have been lower by
$90 to $180 million, had the centralized market design been in place at that time (ERCOT,
2011a). In the previous section, I find that the average hourly cost saving is $5,062, which
amounts to $44.3 million on an annual base. This number is smaller than the aforemen-
tioned estimates, but of the same order of magnitude. The difference between my estimate
and the engineering estimates suggests that changes in market power during the redesign is
also important in determining generation cost savings.
Benefit
Generation Cost Saving($m/year) 44.3 (Author’s Calculation)
Ancillary Services Cost Saving($m/year) 17.0 (ERCOT, 2011a)
Savings from Improved Generation Siting($m/year) 34.9 (CRA/Resero, 2008)
Cost
One-time Implementation Cost($m) 548.6 (ERCOT, 2011b)
Incremental Operational Costs($m/year) 14.6 (CRA/Resero, 2008)
Environmental Cost($m/year) 111.9-250.0 (Author’s Calculation)
Notes: This table lists the benefits and costs of ERCOT’s market redesign. All numbers are in 2011 dollars.
Table 1.5: The Cost-Benefit Analysis of ERCOT’s Market Redesign
A second question that arises is whether the market redesign is warranted when costs
and benefits are considered. The transition to the centralized market provides a number of
benefits in addition to the decrease in generation cost. Specifically, the centralized market
is expected to reduce annual ancillary service costs by $17 million per year.32 Additionally,
in the long run, the centralized market can lead to improvement in siting of new resources
through more transparent locational marginal prices. CRA/Resero (2008) estimates this
benefit to be $34.9 million per year. However, this transition also carries several costs,
principally the external costs from increasing emission levels, but also a one-time imple-
mentation cost of $ 548.6 million as well as yearly recurring expenses of $14 million. Table
1.5 summarizes these benefit and cost components. Taken together, the picture that emerges
is that the redesign will be cost effective for the first 10 years of operation if the discount
rate is less than 8% without considering environmental costs. However, the market redesign
32Ancillary services are those services necessary to maintain grid stability and support continuous balance
between supply and demand.
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will create a social welfare loss when the environmental impacts are taken into account.33
1.8 Conclusion
This paper examines the impact of the Texas electricity market redesign on both market ef-
ficiency and social welfare. To do so, I use a flexible semi-parametric approach to estimate
the changes in generation allocation among different types of generators. I then use these
estimates to quantify the associated changes in production costs and emissions. My results
show that the market redesign improves market efficiency, suggesting that the informational
benefits created by a centralized market outweighs any change in market power incentives.
Currently, a centralized market design is the norm for all deregulated electricity markets in
the US. This paper provides evidence supporting such a practice on the basis of efficiency.
Worldwide, there are still regions that either have not restructured their electricity markets
or have adopted a bilateral trading model. The Texas’ experience also provides a useful
reference for those regions that may consider a move to a centralized market. Given that
my estimates are based on the market conditions in Texas, in future research, it would be
interesting to conduct a cross-market comparison to better understand any market-specific
drivers that may impact the direction and magnitude of the efficiency changes.
While my results attest to the superiority of the centralized market design in terms of
efficiency, I also find that the transition to a centralized market increases emission levels.
The conflict between efficiency improvement and pollution mitigation is a result of the
disparity between private and social costs, rather than flaws in the design per se. Setting
up carbon pricing schemes or appropriate emission caps provides one solution to resolve
this conflict. In recent years, the idea of an ISO-administered “carbon adder” – a price
on carbon added to generators’ bids – has been proposed as an alternative way to reduce
carbon emissions. I find the environmental cost associated with increasing emissions is
not trivial. In fact, when those costs are taken into account, the redesign no longer passes a
cost-benefit test. This finding highlights the need to take environmental impact into account
when we make decisions in the energy market.
33One caveat that should be noted is that the extrapolation is based on the market conditions between June
1, 2010 to August 31, 2011. During the subsequent years, natural gas prices have dropped from about $4/
MMBtu to less than $2/ MMBtu. This decrease in natural gas prices has led to widespread substitution of
natural gas for coal (Cullen and Mansur, 2014). On the one hand, since some natural gas power plants, espe-
cially the combined-cycle plants, are ahead of coal in the merit order, we may not see as much displacement
of natural gas generation by coal generation in the later years as in 2011. Hence, the environmental cost may
be substantially lower in the later years than the estimates shown here. On the other hand, private cost savings
from the market redesign may also be lower, given smaller differences in marginal costs among generators.
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CHAPTER 2
Greener Fuel, Bluer Sky? The Impact of Motor
Fuel Standards on Air Quality in China
2.1 Introduction
Air quality in China is notoriously poor. As one example, on January 12, 2013, Beijing
saw a jaw-dropping reading of 755 on the Air Quality Index (AQI) which nominally maxes
out at 500.1 According to the World Bank, 16 Chinese cities appeared on the list of the
world’s top 20 most polluted cities.2 Asia Development Bank also reports that less than
1 percent of the largest Chinese cities meet the air quality standards recommended by the
World Health Organization (Zhang and Crooks, 2012).
The transportation sector is a major source of air pollution in metropolitan areas of
China. For example, car emissions account for 22.2 percent of Beijing’s PM2.5 particles,
according to the monitoring data released by the Beijing Municipal Environmental Protec-
tion Bureau in 2012.3 Motor vehicles are also a significant source of CO, HC, and NOx
emissions, all of which are produced through inefficient or incomplete combustion. Fuel
quality is a key determinant of vehicle emissions. It is now understood that lowering fuel
sulfur levels not only reduces direct emissions of various pollutants, but also enables the
use of certain advanced pollution control technologies in vehicles. In fact, sulfur levels
must be reduced to near zero if the maximum benefits are to be achieved by the most ad-
vanced technologies used today (Walsh, 2013).
In recognition of the importance of low-sulfur fuel, China, among many other coun-
1The reading is recorded by an air-quality monitoring device atop the United States embassy in Beijing.
2“The Most Polluted Places On Earth”. CBS News. January 8, 2010 (Retrieved March 23, 2014).
3http://www.china.org.cn/environment/2013-09/25/content_30129133.htm
(Retrieved March 23, 2014)
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tries, set up a series of fuel quality standards to gradually reduce the sulfur content levels.
The introduction of CHINA III fuels is a major upgrade in the recent decade. The maxi-
mum sulfur level is mandated to be 350 ppm lower for gasoline and 1650 ppm lower for
diesel. Despite the drastic change in sulfur content levels, little is known about its overall
effectiveness in reducing air pollution. In the United States and Europe, some research pro-
grams were established to estimate the relationship between reductions in sulfur levels and
changes in vehicle emissions.4 However, the results from these engineering models depend
heavily on the assumed on-road vehicle fleet and the catalytic systems in use, which renders
their estimates not directly applicable to the Chinese context. Furthermore, as established
by many economic studies, behavioral responses from both consumers and producers are
important factors in determining the actual effectiveness of an environmental policy. On
the consumer’s side, Davis (2008) shows that the driving restriction in Mexico City is inef-
fective in reducing air pollution because it led to an increase in the total number of vehicles
in circulation as well as a change in composition toward high-emission vehicles. On the
supplier’s side, Auffhammer and Kellogg (2011) finds that the federal gasoline regulation
standards, which allow refiners’ flexibility in choosing a compliance mechanism did not
improve air quality because the compliance options chosen by refiners did not reduce e-
missions of those compounds most prone to forming ozone. An engineering model cannot
possibly take into account such behavioral responses.
This paper seeks to fill this gap by assessing the impact of CHINA III fuel standards on
air pollution using actual daily air quality data. Air pollution levels are compared within
a relatively narrow time window before and after the implementation of the new standard-
s. The analysis controls for confounding factors by employing a regression discontinuity
(RD) design and including a rich set of explanatory variables. In the primary specification,
I use high-order polynomial time trends to control for time-varying unobservables. As a
robustness check, I also consider a local linear regression using only observations within
a two-year window. To evaluate the credibility of the identification strategy, I complement
the RD analysis with a difference-in-difference method (DID) approach, taking advantage
of the spatial and temporal variation with which the regulations were applied. These ap-
proaches are similar to Auffhammer and Kellogg (2011) and Chen and Whalley (2012).
The primary finding of this paper is that while the introduction of CHINA III gasoline
4One such program is the European Program on Emissions, Fuels and Engine Technologies (EPEFE). It
finds that exhaust emissions of HC, CO and NOx went down as the fuel sulfur level dropped from 382 ppm
to 18 ppm. The effects were generally linear at around 8-10% in urban driving and 20-50% in high speed
driving (Petit et al, 1996).
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standard substantially reduces air pollution, there is no evidence of improvement as a result
of CHINA III diesel standard. Air pollution is reduced by 6% on average after CHINA III
gasoline standard came into effect. By contrast, the average reduction effect of CHINA
III diesel standard is only 1.5% and insignificant. These results are robust to alternative
specifications and measures. I then explore potential explanations for these divergent out-
comes and find two contributing factors: the lack of cost pass-though and the presence
of a loophole in the diesel policy. First, desulfurization is more costly for diesel than for
gasoline. But refineries are not able to pass the incremental costs to final consumers due
to retail price caps. The lack of price differentials discourages refineries from installing
costly desulfurization facilities. While such non-compliant motives exist for both gasoline
and diesel, the presence of a loophole in the diesel policy makes evasion only possible for
diesel. Specifically, off-road diesel is subject to a less stringent standard but indistinguish-
able from on-road diesel to naked eyes. Hence, off-road diesel may be used to fill on-road
vehicles without being detected at gas stations. Given its illegality, irrefutable evidence is
difficult to obtain, but anecdotal evidence from news articles confirms such a practice.
With the pollution reduction estimates, I also examine the magnitude of the associat-
ed health benefits in economic terms. I quantify the annual health benefits of CHINA III
gasoline standard by using the well documented mortality effect of PM10 exposure in the
epidemiological literature. An annual reduction of PM10 by 7.7 percent leads to an estimate
of 23,665 lives saved nationwide. Using the value of a statistical life suggested by Wang
and He (2010), I find the economic benefit amounts to $3.0 billion per year, outweighing
the upgrading cost of $28.2 million. This result justifies promoting low-sulfur gasoline on
a cost-effective basis. This estimate also serves as a lower bound for the benefit of CHINA
III diesel standard that is foregone.
The remainder of the chapter goes as follows: Section 2.2 and 2.3 provides a descrip-
tion of the policy background and the data I use. Section 2.4 introduces the identification
strategies and presents the results from both main and alternative specifications. Section
2.5 discusses the implication of the results, and Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Policy Background
Sulfur is a natural component in crude oil that ends up in gasoline and diesel unless be-
ing removed. Fuel sulfur not only contributes to the sulfur dioxide levels in ambient air,
but also undermines the effectiveness of catalytic converters and leads to higher tailpipe
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emissions of other pollutants such as nitrogen oxides, carbon monoxide and fine particles.
Upon combustion, fuel sulfur is oxidized to sulfur oxides, primarily sulfur dioxide (SO2)
with small amounts of sulfur trioxide (SO3). Sulfur oxides combine easily with base metal
oxides and form sulfates which constitute a significant portion of the particle mass in the
atmosphere. More importantly, the presence of sulfur as an oxide or sulfide inhibit the cat-
alytic function of automobile exhaust catalysts. The sulfur species adsorb on the catalyst
site which is then not available for the preferred catalytic reactions, resulting in less overall
activity and more emissions (Manufacturers of Emission Controls Association, 1998).
In recognition of the key role sulfur plays in reducing vehicle emissions, the Environ-
mental Protection Agency (EPA) in the US has adopted increasingly stringent standards on
sulfur content over the past decade. Under Tier 2 Rule, all gasoline sold in the US must
meet an average sulfur level of 30 ppm with a 80 ppm cap starting from 2006. A 15 ppm
sulfur specification, known as ultra low sulfur diesel (ULSD), was phased in for highway
diesel from 2006 to 2010 and for nonroad, locomotive, and marine (NRLM) engines from
2007 to 2014. These fuel requirements, coupled with advanced emission control technolo-
gies, were expected to decrease emissions by more than 90%. In 2013, the EPA proposed
Tier 3 Standard which further tightens the cap to 10 ppm.5 In Europe, fuel sulfur levels
have been declining as well, since at least 1980. The sulfur level for gasoline and highway
diesel was reduced to a uniform standard of 50 ppm in 2005. The standards are currently
set at 10 ppm maximum for all transportation fuels.
By contrast, in China, progression to low-sulfur fuel was very slow. Despite the mount-
ing health consequences of severe air pollution, the first national fuel sulfur regulation did
not come through until the early 2000. The maximum sulfur levels were set at 500 ppm for
gasoline and 2000 ppm for diesel, respectively. The standards remained unchanged until
2010. Starting from January 1, 2010, gasoline must meet CHINA III standard with a 150
ppm cap. On July 1, 2011, diesel must meet CHINA III standard as well. Table 2.1 outlines
major steps China has taken or plan to take to improve motor fuel quality.6 The standards
generally follow European precedents, with minor adjustment. The current national stan-
dard for gasoline and diesel is CHINA IV.
This paper focuses on the introduction of CHINA III standards for gasoline and diesel.
5For more information about fuel sulfur regulations in the US, please refer to the EPA’s website: http:
//www.epa.gov/otaq/fuels/index.htm.
6Although these standards also regulate other chemical contents, the predominant change in each standard




















































Table 2.1: Major Steps of China’s Nationwide Fuel Quality Improvement
There are two reasons to focus on CHINA III. First, the magnitude of this upgrade is the
largest in the recent decade. The implementation of CHINA III is set to reduce the maxi-
mum sulfur level by 350 ppm for gasoline and 1650 ppm for diesel.7 Second, the availabil-
ity of consistent air quality and weather measures during that period allows me to compare
and identify the changes in air quality due to the new standards.
Cities in China may choose to develop and implement their own fuel quality standards
without requiring national-level approval. The standards are usually issued by local envi-
ronmental protection agency after negotiating with the major state-owned oil companies.
The four most developed cities in China, namely Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou and Shen-
zhen, promoted low-sulfur fuels earlier than the national implementation dates. Table 2.2
summarizes the implementation dates for those cities. One motivating factor to implement
higher fuel quality standards is to prepare for international events. For example, Beijing
and Shanghai rolled out CHINA IV standards about 6-8 months prior to the Olympics and
the World Exposition. Such variations in timing allow me to do a difference-in-difference
analysis as a secondary specification.
7CHINA II diesel is only a recommended standard. It has never been enforced.
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City Gasoline Diesel
China III China IV China V China III China IV China V
Beijing 07/01/2005 01/01/2008 08/01/2012 07/01/2005 01/01/2008 08/01/2012
Guangzhou 05/01/2008 08/01/2010 05/01/2008 01/01/2014
Shanghai – 10/01/2009 12/01/2013 – 10/01/2009 12/01/2013
Shenzhen 03/01/2007 01/01/2011 03/01/2007
Nation 01/01/2010 01/01/2014 01/01/2018 07/01/2011 01/01/2015 01/01/2018
Table 2.2: Summary of Implementation Dates
2.3 Data
The sample period includes all observations within a 6 year window around the national
implementation date of China III gasoline, which runs from January 1, 2007 through De-
cember 31, 2012. It is the largest symmetric window in which air pollution indexes are
available. This section provides more details on the data I use.
2.3.1 Air Pollution Index (API)
Air quality is measured and recorded by the Ministry of Environment Protection (MEP)
of China. On June 5, 2000, MEP started to publish a daily Air Pollution Index (API) for
86 cities including all provincial capitals and municipalities. MEP continued to publish
API for those cities until January 15, 2013 when the new Ambient Air Quality Standard
(AAQS) came into effect. Under AAQS, MEP reports a new measure, namely Air Quality
Index (AQI), for 58 cities (including all provincial capitals and municipalities), leaving the
rest covered in the original API calculation.
For each city, MEP measures the concentrations of three pollutants, i.e., NO2, SO2 and
PM10, and converts daily mean into a pollutant-specific API ranging from 0 to 500.8 The




(Ix,u− Ix,l) + Ix,l x ∈ {S O2,NO2,PM10} (2.1)
8 The description here is based on Technical Requirements for Urban Air Quality Daily Report ([2000]
No. 26). MEP stipulates the number of stations according to city population and size, and computes the daily
city averages over all stations and all hours. The daily report uses data from 12:00pm from the previous day
to 12:00pm of today.
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100 150 150 120 II Good No health implica-
tions
50 50 50 80 I Excellent
Source: Technical Requirements for Urban Air Quality Daily (2000), China
Table 2.3: API Cutoff Points and Corresponding Health Implications
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Where APIx is the air pollution index for pollutant x. Cx,l and Cx,u are the lower and
upper boundaries that the concentration of pollutant x Cx falls in, and Ix,u and Ix,l are the
corresponding breakpoints of the overall API.9 The cutoff points for different levels of API
are summarized in Table 2.3. The overall API is the maximum of all pollutant-specific
APIs. If that maximum exceeds 500, the overall API is capped at 500. MEP partitions the
overall API into five categories: 0-50, 50-100, 100-200, 200-300, and 300-500, and pro-
vides health recommendations for each grade. In addition, the primary pollutant is reported
when API is greater than 50. Therefore, the concentration of the primary pollutant can be
inferred from the API score when the primary pollutant is identified. Table 2.4 reports the
summary statistics. In the sample, 69.53 % of observations reported PM10 as the primary
pollutant, 0.14 % reported NO2 and 6.30% reported SO2. The remaining 24.03 % have an
API below 50.
2.3.2 Meteorological Data
Meteorological factors are correlated with air pollution. I use the meteorological data ob-
tained from Global Summary of the Day (GSOD). This dataset come from the National
Climatic Data Center (NCDC) under the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Adminis-
tration (NOAA) of the United States. The daily weather summaries are based on data
exchanged under the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) World Weather Watch
Program, which are ultimately collected by the weather stations under the China Meteoro-
logical Administration (CMA).
Of the 86 cities that are covered in API reports, 59 cities have daily weather records
during the sample period. Figure 2.1 shows the locations of these cities. The variables
reported are mean temperature (TEMP, .1 Fahrenheit), maximum temperature (MAX, .1
Fahrenheit), minimum temperature (MIN, .1 Fahrenheit), mean wind speed (WDSP, .1
knots), maximum sustained wind speed (MXSPD, .1 knots), precipitation amount (PCP,
.01 inches) and mean visibility (VSB, .1 miles). Their summary statistics are also reported
in Table 2.4.
9For example, if the daily mean of SO2 is 600 µg/m3, the corresponding API for SO2 is (600-150)/(800-
150)*(200-100)+100=169.
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Figure 2.1: Location Map of the Sample Cities
2.4 Empirical Strategies and Results
In this section, I introduce the empirical approaches and present the results. The goal is
to identify the extent to which fuel quality improvement ameliorates air pollution. Fol-
lowing Davis (2008), Auffhammer and Kellogg (2011) and Chen and Whalley (2012), I
assess the impacts by employing both a time series regression discontinuity (RD) design
and a difference-in-difference method (DID). In the primary specification, I conduct a time
series regression discontinuity (RD) with high-order polynomial time trends using the full
sample. I also consider two alternative specifications: a local linear regression using only
observations within a two-year window and a difference-in-difference method (DID) tak-
ing advantage of the spatial and temporal variation with which the regulations were applied.
2.4.1 Main Results: Regression Discontinuity (RD) Design
The idea of this approach is to focus on a narrow window of time around the implemen-
tation of new fuel standards so that observations before the change provide a comparison
group for observations after the change. The usual omitted variable problem does not con-
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Variable N Mean Std Min Max
API 127,808 67.76 30.94 0 500
Primary Pollutant
PM10 88,870 103.90 50.38 52 598.4
NO2 173 118.19 21.46 81.6 198.4









TEMP 127,808 58.35 20.61 -23.3 96.9
MAX 127,808 66.96 20.62 -14.3 110.3
MIN 127,808 49.88 21.59 -31 89.2
WDSP 127,808 4.89 2.60 0 34.4
MXSPD 127,776 9.11 4.51 1.9 46.6
PCP 123,781 0.11 0.40 0 17.36
VSB 127,804 8.08 4.58 0 22.1
Table 2.4: Descriptive Statistics of the Data
taminate identification, as long as the unobserved factors do not change discontinuously
when new fuel standards are phased in (Hahn et al, 2001).
ln(APIct) = αc ·Treatct +βc ·Wct +λc · Dt + fc(t) +µc +εct (2.2)
The estimation equation is given in (2.2). Treatct here is a vector indicating the imple-
mentation status of CHINA III for gasoline and diesel. CHINA II gasoline and CHINA I
diesel form the baseline against which these standards are compared.10 All the coefficients
are city-specific. In other words, I estimate (2.2) one city at a time. I exclude Beijing,
Shanghai, Guangzhou and Shenzhen from the sample because they implemented CHINA
III standards for gasoline and diesel at the same time, making it impossible to separate the
effects. Wct is a set of weather controls including current and one-day lag quartic polynomi-
als in mean, max and min temperatures, mean wind speed, maximum sustained wind speed,
precipitation as well as the interaction between mean temperature, mean wind speed and
precipitation. Dt denotes other controls including year fixed effects, month fixed effects,
10Note that CHINA II diesel is only a recommended standard that has never been enforced.
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day-of-week variables, and indicators for national holidays and heating days.11 The vector
fc(t) is a 9th-order Chebychev polynomial time trend that flexibly controls for time-series
variation in pollution that would have occurred in absence of fuel quality upgrades. Fuel
at retail stations and gas tanks does not completely turn over in a single day. I therefore
allow for a 2-month linear phase-in of the treatment effect after the official implementation
dates.12 Finally, µc are city fixed effects. The standard errors are clustered on each month-
year combination to allow for serial correlation within a month.
The first two columns in Table 2.5 report the results from estimations of equation (2.2).
The mean effect of CHINA III gasoline is -0.060 with p-value 0.054. Therefore we can
reject the mean effect is zero at close to the 95% confidence level. By contrast, the mean
effect of CHINA III diesel is only -0.015 with p-value 0.664. We cannot conclude that air
quality has been significantly improved after CHINA III diesel standard came into effect.
The difference is also illustrated by the distribution of the estimates shown in Figure 2.2.
The distribution of the gasoline estimates is shifted to the left relative to that of diesel. The
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distributions returns a p-value of 0.09, which sug-
gests that we can reject that the distributions of gasoline and diesel estimates are the same
at the 90% confidence level. Figure 2.3 further plots the daily log API residuals for the city
of Hangzhou that is characteristic of the results. The fitted line is the time series of predict-
ed values of the treatment effects plus the polynomial time trend. The points plotted are the
sum of this fitted line with the residuals from the regression. We can see a clear reduction
in the air pollution level after CHINA III gasoline is fully phased in. By comparison, the
RD effect of CHINA III diesel is hardly discernable.
Because API is an aggregated index used only in China, it is difficult to interpret and
compare the results with the findings of previous studies. About 70 percent of observations
in the sample reported PM10 as the primary pollutant. Given the way API is constructed, I
am able to back out the level of PM10 from the aggregated API for those observations. The
third and fourth columns in Table 2.5 show the RD results using log PM10 as the dependent
variable. The average effect of CHINA III gasoline on log PM10 is -0.077, while the aver-
age effect of CHINA III diesel is 0.013. Again, the p-values suggest that only the average
11The indicator for heating days takes on value one for cities north of Huai River and Qinling Mountains
between November 15 to March 15, and zero otherwise. Almond et al (2009) shows that the heating policy
in China leads to higher pollution concentrations in northern China where coal is burned for winter heating
of homes and offices.
12According to practitioners, complete natural displacement requires 2 to 3 turnovers at gas stations and
oil depots. The process generally takes 1-2 months, depending on the sales amount.
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effect of CHINA III gasoline is significantly different from zero.
Effect on ln(API) Effect on ln(PM10) Effect on ln (VSB)
Gasoline Diesel Gasoline Diesel Gasoline Diesel
Mean -0.060 -0.015 -0.077 0.013 0.127 0.004
P-value 0.054 0.664 0.023 0.732 0.000 0.878
Notes: Estimates shown are average effects of CHINA III gasoline and diesel standards across cities using
the regression discontinuity specification (2.2). Standard errors are clustered at month-year level. The P-
values are obtained from the test of the null hypothesis H0: the mean effect is zero against the alternative
hypothesis Ha: the mean effect is not zero.
Table 2.5: Regression Discontinuity Results: Six-year Window
Notes: The figure displays the smoothed cross-city distribution of estimated treatment
effects from equation (2.2). The smoother uses an Epanechnikov kernel with a
bandwidth of 0.1.
Figure 2.2: Distribution of Estimated RD Effects: Primary Specification
2.4.2 Robustness Checks
In this section, I conduct several robustness checks with different covariates and dependent
variables. The first exercise is to experiment with different orders of polynomials for time
trends. The top three rows in Table 2.6 report average effects and p-values from regressions
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Figure 2.3: Daily Log API Residuals for the City of Hangzhou
of model (2.2) with seventh-, eighth- and tenth-order of polynomials. The estimates from
these specifications are consistent with the main results, suggesting that on average, the
change of gasoline standard has a more salient effect on air quality than that of diesel.
Second, I examine the changes in gasoline and diesel prices as potential confounding
factors. Retail fuel prices are heavily regulated in China, as policymakers are very con-
cerned about its impact on inflation. The National Development and Reform Commission
(NDRC) sets price caps for retail gasoline and diesel based on crude prices in the global
market.13 Figure 2.4 shows the retail fuel price caps from 2007 to 2012. It generally fol-
lows an upward trend. The two vertical lines indicate the time when the new fuel standards
came into effect. There were no changes during the time when CHINA III gasoline and
diesel standards were phased in. This lifts the concern that the RD results are contaminated
by the adjustment in driving behaviors in response to fuel price changes. Nevertheless, I
include gasoline and diesel price caps in model (2.2) and redo the analysis for each city.
The results shown in the fourth row of Table 2.6 suggest that the mean effects are slightly
smaller, but still exhibit the same pattern.
13The current pricing system adjusts retail gasoline and diesel prices every 10 working days if price changes
in international oil markets (Brent, Dubai and Cinta) are more than 50 CNY per metric ton. Prior to that,
domestic fuel prices were adjusted when prices for crude moved by more than 4 percent over 22 working
days.
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CHINA III gasoline CHINA III diesel
Mean Effect P-value Mean Effect P-value
Seventh-order polynomial time trend -0.087 0.008 0.027 0.311
Eighth-order polynomial time trend -0.065 0.035 -0.027 0.425
Tenth-order polynomial time trend -0.067 0.034 -0.011 0.756
Including fuel prices -0.056 0.078 -0.015 0.669
Local linear regression -0.076 0.000 -0.016 0.488
Notes: Estimates shown are average effects of CHINA III gasoline and diesel standards across cities using alternative
specifications with different time trends, time windows and control variables. The P-values are obtained from the test
of H0: the mean effect is zero vs. Ha: the mean effect is not zero.
Table 2.6: Regression Discontinuity Results: Robustness Check
Finally, I address the concern about the credibility of API measures. Andrews (2008),
Chen et al (2012) and Ghanem and Zhang (2013) provide suggestive evidence that some
Chinese cities manipulate their air pollution data in response to the incentives set by the
central government. They find that some cities reported dubious pollution data that leads
to discontinuity at API equal to 100 which is the cutoff for “blue-sky days.” To resolve
the issue with the credibility of air quality measures, I use visibility as a proxy for air
quality. Visibility is defined as the greatest distance at which a black object of suitable
dimensions, situated near the ground, can be seen and recognized when observed against
a bright background. Numerous studies have demonstrated that particulate matters can
cause visibility impairment (Sisler and Malm, 1994). Visibility data are routinely collected
at meteorology stations throughout the world. Since weather stations are less prone to
political interference, visibility can be used as an alternative measure of air quality. The
last two columns in Table 2.5 report RD estimates using log visibility as the dependent
variable. The RD estimates suggest that the average effect of CHINA III gasoline is 0.127,
while the average effect of CHINA III diesel is 0.004. Positive estimates indicate greater
visibility, hence better air condition. Again, only the effect of gasoline is significant, which
is consistent with the previous findings.
2.4.3 Alternative Specification: Local Linear Regression Discontinu-
ity Design
In this section, I consider an alternative specification that only uses observations within a
two-year window around the implementation dates as an important validity check. Gen-
erally, choosing a sample containing more observations increases the preciseness of the
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Notes: The vertical lines indicate the dates when CHINA III gasoline and diesel
standards took effect.
Data Source: National Development and Reform Commission of China
Figure 2.4: Retail Price Caps in China: 2007-2012
estimates, but also causes concerns, as those observations further away from the implemen-
tation threshold are less comparable to each other. A two-year window seems to balance
this trade-off by allowing to control for full seasonality with a minimal number of years
involved. Following Imbens and Lemieux (2008), I fit linear regression functions to the
observations within one year on either side of the phase-in period. The estimation equation
is given in (2.3). Treatct here is a variable indicating the implementation status of CHINA
III. I estimate this equation separately for gasoline and diesel using observations within a
two-year window centered around each phase-in period. Time trends are allowed to differ
before and after.
ln(APIct) = αc ·Treatct +βc ·Wct +λc · Dt +γc · t +δc · t×Treatct +µc +εct (2.3)
The last row in Table 2.6 reports the local linear RD results. The mean effect of CHI-
NA III gasoline is -0.076 with p-value 0.000, while the mean effect of CHINA III diesel
is only -0.016 with p-value 0.488. The difference is also illustrated by the distribution of
the estimates shown in Figure 2.5. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test returns a p-value of 0.03,
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suggesting that we can reject the equality of distributions at the 95% confidence level. Sim-
ilar to the previous findings, only CHINA III gasoline standard has significantly improved
air quality. Figure 2.6 and 2.7 also plot the daily log API residuals for cities that are char-
acteristic of these results. Figure 2.6 depicts the RD result of CHINA III gasoline for the
city of Guilin. There is a noticeable reduction in the air pollution level after CHINA III
gasoline is fully phased in. Accordingly, the point estimate is -0.077. By comparison, the
RD effect of CHINA III diesel for the city of Hangzhou is hardly discernable, as shown in
Figure 2.7. The point estimate suggests that the new diesel standard only reduced API by
2 percent.
Notes: The figure displays the smoothed cross-city distribution of estimated treatment
effects from equation (2.3). The smoother uses an Epanechnikov kernel with a
bandwidth of 0.1.
Figure 2.5: Distribution of Estimated RD Effects: Local Linear Regression
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Figure 2.6: Daily Log API Residuals for the City of Guilin
Figure 2.7: Daily Log API Residuals for the City of Hangzhou
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2.4.4 Alternative Specification: Difference-in-Difference Method (DID)
The identifying assumption for the RD estimation is that, without the new fuel standard-
s, air quality would not have discontinuously changed during the phase-in period. For
example, the assumption would be violated if emissions from industrial sectors changed
discontinuously due to some contemporaneous policy shift. To the best of my knowledge,
I am not aware of any such policy introduced on a national scale at the same time as the
fuel standards. However, as this assumption is fundamentally untestable, I complement my
analysis with a difference-in-difference specification.
This approach takes advantage of the fact that cities upgrade their fuel quality at dif-
ferent paces. While the majority moved from China II to China III only when the new
standard came into effect, four cities have implemented it earlier than that. The fact that
those cities upgrade gasoline and diesel at the same time makes it impossible to separate
their respective effects for these cities. Nonetheless, they can serve as a control group to
form the counterfactual of how air quality would have evolved without changes in fuel s-
tandards during the national implementation period. If other national policies came into
effect at the same time, it would have affected all the cities, thus leaving the differences
unchanged. Therefore, we can attribute the changes in the differences to the new fuel stan-
dards.
One caveat regarding using this approach is that, as one may notice, the cities that have
implemented CHINA III standards earlier are the most developed metropolises in China.
As a result, they may experience forces that cause air pollution to increase or decrease over
time relative to other cities. For example, economic activity may grow more quickly, which
tends to be more polluting. Or these areas may also be more aware of environment issues
and thus undertake more strict pollution control actions. Therefore, the parallel trend is less
likely to hold for an extended period of time. To address this concern, I focus on a narrower
6-month window around the implementation dates for this analysis. Moreover, in some of
the specifications, I allow city-specific linear or quadratic trends to distinguish the impacts
of fuel regulations from individual trends driven by unobservables.
ln(APIct) = α ·Treatct +β ·Wct +λ · Dt +µc +δ ·Trendct +εct (2.4)
The model is given by equation (2.4). Treatct is a a variable indicating the imple-
mentation status of CHINA III gasoline or diesel. Trendct captures city-specific linear or
quadratic trends. Wct and Dt include the same set of variables as in the RD setting. For
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inference, I allow the error terms to be correlated within the same city.
Dependent Variable: ln(daily API)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
CHINA III gasoline 0.035 -0.042 -0.049** -0.046*** -0.047***
(0.039) (0.031) (0.023) (0.008) (0.008)
City FEs Y Y Y Y Y
Month FEs Y Y Y Y Y
Weather controls N Y Y Y Y
DOW FEs N N Y Y Y
Holiday N N Y Y Y
Heating N N Y Y Y
City-specific trends N N N Y Y
City-specific quad trends N N N N Y
N 10,618 10,098 10,098 10,098 10,098
R2 0.304 0.518 0.522 0.551 0.571
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by city. All effects are relative to the omitted
baseline of CHINA II gasoline. The sample period is from November 1, 2009 to April 30, 2010.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level
** Significant at the 5 percent level
* Significant at the 10 percent level
Table 2.7: Difference-In-Difference Estimation Results: CHINA III Gasoline
The DID estimates are given in Table 2.7 and Table 2.8 for gasoline and diesel, re-
spectively. The top row in each table reports the estimated effect of CHINA III standards.
Moving from specification (1) to (5), I progressively add control variables which include
weather, day-of-week variables, indicators for holidays and heating seasons, as well as
city-specific time trends. Without these controls, neither of the effects is significant. How-
ever, after including city-specific time trends, the effect becomes statistically significant
for CHINA III gasoline, while the effect of CHINA III diesel remains insignificant. The
point estimates suggest that the introduction of CHINA III gasoline standard reduced API
by 4.7%. Although the magnitudes of the estimates differ somewhat from the RD results,
the overall pattern is very similar.
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Dependent Variable: ln(daily API)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
CHINA III diesel -0.052 -0.038 -0.038 -0.018 0.012
(0.066) (0.053) (0.053) (0.048) (0.048)
City FEs Y Y Y Y Y
Month FEs Y Y Y Y Y
Weather controls N Y Y Y Y
DOW FEs N N Y Y Y
Holiday N N Y Y Y
Heating N N Y Y Y
City-specific trends N N N Y Y
City-specific quad trends N N N N Y
N 10,796 10,099 10,099 10,099 10,099
R2 0.282 0.482 0.484 0.526 0.560
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by city. All effects are relative to the omitted
baseline of CHINA I diesel. The sample period is from May 1, 2011 to October 31, 2011.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level
** Significant at the 5 percent level
* Significant at the 10 percent level
Table 2.8: Difference-In-Difference Estimation Results: CHINA III Diesel
2.5 Interpretation
2.5.1 Why Is CHINA III Diesel Standard Ineffective?
The finding that the effect of CHINA III diesel standard is insignificant and smaller than
that of CHINA III gasoline standard seems perplexing, especially in view of the following
facts. First, the reduction in the maximum sulfur level is 1650 ppm for diesel, relative to
350 ppm for gasoline. Second, particular matters are the major pollutant 70% of the time
in China, and it has long been understood that diesel engines in general emit more NOx and
particular matters than gasoline engines.14 Finally, more diesel is consumed than gasoline.
Figure 2.8 shows the consumption quantities of gasoline and diesel in the transportation
sector in China from 2007 to 2012. The amount of diesel consumed is roughly twice the
amount of gasoline.
14Please refer to this website: http://www.isuzu.co.jp/world/technology/clean/
diesel_gasoline01.html.
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Data Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China
Figure 2.8: Gasoline and Diesel Consumption in the Transportation Sector: 2007-2012
Based on all the aforementioned facts, we should expect the diesel upgrade to have an
effect at least as large as that of gasoline. The lack of an effect for CHINA III diesel seems
to suggest that the new standard might not have been complied with as it should be. In this
section, I consider two possible explanations for the different compliance responses from
petroleum companies.15
2.5.1.1 Cost Difference in Desulfurization with No Pass-through
In China, the regulatory authorities of fuel quality are spread among several agencies under
the state council. The structure is illustrated in Figure 2.9. Fuel quality standards are issued
by the Standardization Administration of China (SAC) under the General Administration of
Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine (AQSIQ), while fuel prices are regulated
by National Development and Reform Committee (NDRC)16. The decentralized structure
15In China, the petroleum industry is controlled by three state-owned vertically-integrated enterprises,
namely, PetroChina, Sinopec and CNOOC.
16The Technical Committee under SAC in charge of drafting fuel quality standards is known as TC280,
which consists of experts from the three major state-owned petroleum companies, the MEP and the auto
industry. More than 90% of the members in TC280 are from petroleum companies, including the chairman
of the committee. The secretariat of TC280 is based at Sinopec petrochemical research institute.
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created coordination difficulty on fuel quality upgrades, as evidenced by the fact that the
implementation of the new standards was not accompanied with either any fiscal help from
the Ministry of Finance (MOF) or any adjustment in retail fuel prices by NDRC. Figure 2.4
confirms that there was no change in retail price caps when CHINA III gasoline and diesel
standards were phased in.
Figure 2.9: Structure of Government Bodies Related to Fuel Quality
Gasoline Diesel
Liu et al (2008) 0.9 1.3
Trans-Energy (2002) 1.1 2.1
Notes: All numbers are in US cents per gallon.
Table 2.9: Estimated Incremental Cost of Desulfurization
Consequently, refineries have to bear the entire cost of fuel upgrades. Table 2.9 lists
two estimates from the previous literature on the incremental costs for Chinese refineries,
when the sulfur level is reduced from 500 ppm to 150 ppm for gasoline and from 2000
ppm to 350 ppm for diesel. Both estimates suggest that it is more costly to upgrade diesel
than gasoline. The cost difference amounts to 66.4 million dollars in 2011.17 Without cost
17According to National Bureau of Statistics of China, in 2011, the total production quantities of gasoline
and diesel are 79.2, 156.9 million tons respectively. Using Trans-Energy (2002)’s estimates, the annual cost
difference is 156.9*0.021*28.56-79.2*0.011*31.75=66.4 million dollars, where 28.56 and 31.75 are used to
convert tons to gallons for gasoline and diesel.
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pass-through, upgrading diesel would have exacerbated the financial difficulty that many
refineries were already facing.18
2.5.1.2 A Loophole in the Diesel Policy: Differential Standards for On-road and Off-
road Diesel
While the lack of pass-through provides non-compliance motive for refineries, the presence
of a much relaxed standard for off-road diesel facilitates evasion behavior for diesel produc-
ers. Off-road diesel (a.k.a “general diesel” in China) is used for trailers, locomotives with
internal combustion engines, construction machinery, vessels, generator sets, 3-wheelers
and low-speed trucks. Non-road diesel was subject to a different national standard which
allows the maximum sulfur level to be as high as 2,000 ppm until July 1, 2013. In reality,
on-road and off-road diesel are indistinguishable to the naked eyes. At gas stations, both
of them are just labeled as diesel. Most consumers are not aware of the differences of the
two, and even for inspectors, telling them apart would be impossible without lab tests.
The less stringent standard for off-road diesel creates a loophole to circumvent new
regulations, as off-road diesel can be used for on-road vehicles illegally without being de-
tected. Since there is no counterpart for gasoline, this could explain the different outcomes
we observe for fuel upgrades. Such a practice has been reported by the news media.19
Due to the illegal nature of this behavior and data limitation, empirical evidence on evasion
activities is hard to obtain. However, an analogous situation has been documented and s-
tudied by Marion and Muehlegger (2008). In the US, diesel fuel used for on-road purposes
is taxed, while other uses are untaxed, creating an incentive for firms and individuals to
evade on-road diesel taxes by purchasing untaxed diesel fuel and then using it for on-road
purposes. In response to that, the IRS and the EPA required fuel dye to be added to all
diesel fuel not meant for on-highway use. This innovation substantially reduced the cost
of enforcement by allowing regulators to randomly test trucks through a simple visual in-
spection. Consequently, they find that sales of diesel fuel rose by 26 percent following the
regulatory change, while sales of heating oil, which is an untaxed perfect substitute, fell
by a similar amount. Their estimates shed light on the magnitude of evasion when on-road
diesel and off-road diesel are hardly distinguishable.
18In 2011, the two dominant players in the refining industry, Sinopec and PetroChina, reported 567 and
911 million dollar losses from the refining business, respectively.
19The following article is one example: http://finance.sina.com.cn/leadership/mroll/
20131029/175517153428.shtml (Retrieved July 15, 2015).
55
2.5.2 Economic Significance
It is also interesting to examine how large the realized air quality benefits are in economic
terms. To do so, one need to link the estimates in air quality improvement with well-
established health effects, and then convert the health benefits to dollar terms using an
appropriate value of a statistical life.
While the epidemiological literature has studied extensively about the relationship be-
tween air pollution and a range of health outcomes, for the purpose of meaningful com-
parison, I only focus on studies examining the impact of air pollution exposure on Chinese
population. Since API is an aggregated pollution index that is not commonly used in the
epidemiological literature, here I use the results on PM10 to calculate the benefits. Two
meta-analyses which systematically review the studies on the effects of short-term expo-
sure to air pollution conclude that a 10 µg/m3 (10%) increase in PM10 was associated with
a 0.31-0.32% increase in daily total mortality (Lai et al, 2013; Zhang et al, 2013). This
translates to 23,665 lives saved per year given the effect of CHINA III gasoline.20 I apply
the value of a statistical life of $128.0 thousand suggested by Wang and He (2010) to cal-
culate the benefits in economic terms. This leads to a total value of lives saved of around
3.0 billion annually, which dwarfs the upgrading cost of only 28.2 million dollars.21
My estimate is likely to represent a lower bound of the full benefit of the improved
gasoline quality for several reasons. First, the fact that primary pollutants are reported only
when API is above 50 implies that I cannot recover the value of PM10 when the fuel up-
grade reduces the pollution level below the threshold. Therefore, the selective attrition may
result in an underestimation of the actual reduction in air pollution. Second, my estimate
is only based on one pollutant and its health consequence, whereas the fuel upgrade is also
very likely to reduce the levels of other pollutants, such as CO, HC, and SO2, as discussed
in section 2.2. Due to the unavailability of pollutant-specific pollution data, I am not able
to quantify the changes in those pollutants and their health effects which could be a signif-
icant portion of the potential benefits. Third, the improved air quality should have led to
lower morbidity rates, the benefit of which is also not captured in the calculation. Finally,
although the evident reduction in air pollution reflects that the new gasoline standard has
20The average annual morality rate in China between 2010 and 2012 is 7.13 per thousand peo-
ple. The average population is 1.347 billion. This yields an estimated annual reduction in deaths of
0.077/0.1*0.0032*0.00713*1.347 billion=23,665.
21The upgrading cost is estimated by multiplying the average production quantity of gasoline from 2010
to 2012 with the incremental cost per gallon suggested by Trans-Energy (2002). The result is 0.011 dol-
lars/gallon* 80.8 million tons*31.75 gallons/ton=28.2 million dollars.
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taken effect in many cities, the lack of a direct measure of enforcement leaves the question
of whether there was full compliance open. If full compliance was not met, then there is
room for the potential benefits to be even higher than what I have found.
2.6 Conclusion
This paper examines the effectiveness of China’s fuel sulfur regulation. In particular, I
study the impacts of CHINA III fuel standards on air quality. Using both a time-series
regression discontinuity design and a difference-in-difference method, I find that the in-
troduction of CHINA III gasoline standard substantially reduces air pollution, while there
is no evidence of improvement as a result of CHINA III diesel standard. The results are
robust to alternative specifications and measures. The ineffectiveness of CHINA III diesel
standard suggests it may not have been complied with. I discuss two potential explanations
for this difference in compliance behavior. First, desulfurization is more costly for diesel
than for gasoline. When cost pass-through is not permitted for the upgraded fuel, the cost
difference is likely to motivate refineries to comply less for diesel. Second, a less stringent
standard for off-road diesel creates a loophole to circumvent new regulations. The fact that
off-road and on-road diesel are indistinguishable to the naked eyes makes it much easier to
cheat on diesel than gasoline.
With the estimated pollution reduction effects, a “back-of envelope” calculation indi-
cates that the health benefits amount to 3.0 billion per year, completely offsetting the up-
grading cost. This finding is consistent with the cost-benefit analyses conducted in the US
and Europe, which show that the magnitude of benefits is at least ten times larger than that
of costs (EPA, 1999). The failure to enforce CHINA III diesel standard incur substantial
social costs. The benefit estimate from the gasoline upgrade also serves as a lower bound
for the foregone benefit of a cleaner diesel.
These results speak to the importance of carefulness in fuel policy design when en-
forcement is inadequate. Without effective enforcement, evasion is likely to prevail as long
as on-road diesel and off-road diesel are still subject to different standards. Simple regu-
latory innovations, like requiring red dye to be added to off-road diesel, can help reduce
supervision cost and prevent cheating. Moreover, providing economic incentives can be an
effective way to overcome weak institutions and make moderately functioning governance
structures work more effectively. If adequate price differentials were allowed to compen-
sate firms for the upgrading costs, this would not only encourage firms to comply with the
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new standards, but also create political pressure to address the loophole problem, because
the group of market participants who already upgraded would share an economic interest
in seeing those standards being enforced.
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CHAPTER 3
Pollution Liability Insurance and Corporate
Environmental Compliance: A Case Study of
Shenzhen
3.1 Introduction
For more than three decades, the Chinese economy has been growing rapidly with an av-
erage annual GDP increase rate of more than 9%. In the same period, China has also
witnessed the deterioration of environment and an increasing number of environmental ac-
cidents. To control environmental risks and ensure adequate compensation for environmen-
tal damages, environmental pollution liability insurance is introduced as a market-oriented
instrument of environmental governance. In case of environmental accidents, the insurance
provides compensation for personal injury and property loss, and covers other related costs
such as contamination clean-up charges.
In this paper, we examine if the insurance requirement improves firms’ environmen-
tal compliance performance as measured by the number of their environmental violations.
Theoretically, the insurance mandate could have two countervailing effects. On the one
hand, the insurance protects firms from liability for accidents, which raises concerns for
moral hazard. Evidence of moral hazard is well-documented in the health and automobile
insurance literature. For example, Cohen and Dehejia (2004) show that traffic incidents in-
crease when compulsory insurance is introduced. On the other hand, insurance companies
set premiums with the goal of forcing firms to internalize the external costs. The pre-
mium is determined based on several characteristics including location, production scale,
industry and evaluation of risk management capability. The latter further depends on past
environmental compliance records (MEP & CIRC, 2013). Rubinstein and Yaari (1983) and
Rogerson (1985) have shown that when premiums can depend on past records in a repeated
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game between insurer and insured and the insured pay their own premiums, incentives to
reduce future premiums counteracts the ill effects of moral hazard. As a result, the net
effect of the mandate is ambiguous from a theoretical standpoint. Therefore, this paper
focuses on providing empirical evidence on the effect of this policy.
Given that the insurance mandate has been carried out on a national scale only recently,
we perform a case study on one of the pioneers in promoting the policy—the city of Shen-
zhen. We focus on the electroplating and circuit board manufacturing firms which account
for 75 percent of the firms that are mandated to purchase the insurance in Shenzhen. For
comparison, we also include two non-required industries: the paper-product industry and
the textile and dyeing industry, and an adjacent city that is not subject to the mandate – the
city of Dongguan. The empirical strategy is a triple difference estimation. We compare
(i) Shenzhen vs. Dongguan (first difference), (ii) before and after the introduction of the
liability insurance (second difference), and (iii) industries covered by this policy vs. not
covered (third difference).
We use a novel dataset on corporate environmental performance that has not been ex-
ploited in the literature. Firms’ compliance performance is measured by the number of
environmental violations they commit in each year. Our empirical results suggest that the
insurance requirement leads to a 73-97 percent reduction in the expected number of viola-
tions. The results are robust to a number of specification checks, including different count
models and OLS estimation. Furthermore, the results are stable across different sample
selection criteria and the data exhibit similar trends across cities prior to treatment, allevi-
ating concerns about selection bias.
Our study is related to several empirical studies on environmental liability and acci-
dents. Alberini and Austin (2002) exploits cross-state variation in mini-superfund pro-
grams to estimate the effect of the programs on uncontrolled toxic releases in the United
States, and find that strict liability reduces the frequency and severity of pollution releases.
Yin et al. (2011) shows that mandating environmental liability insurance for underground
storage tanks can address the inefficiency due to small firms declaring bankruptcy. For the
same reason, bonding requirements for oil companies decrease environmental accidents
(Boomhower, 2016). This paper adds to our understanding of the effect of liability policies
in the Chinese context. This paper also contributes to a growing body of literature show-
ing that mandatory insurance policies can be used as a beneficial form of environmental
regulation (Katzman, 1988; Kolstad et al., 1990; Farber, 1991; Zweifel and Tyran, 1993;
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Ben-Shahar and Logue, 2012).
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 3.2 provides background in-
formation regarding environmental accidents and the pollution liability insurance in China.
Section 3.3 presents a simple model of firms’ optimal safety effort with and without the
insurance. Section 3.4 describes the data. Section 3.5 discusses the results, and section 3.6
concludes.
3.2 Policy Background
3.2.1 Environmental Accidents in China
China’s remarkable economic and industrial development is accompanied with worsening
environmental quality and a growing number of environmental accidents. Figure 3.1 shows
the number of environmental accidents that occurred annually from 2006 to 2014 (China
Environment Yearbook, 2007-2015). On average, there were roughly 540 accidents hap-
pening each year, many of which were catastrophic, resulting in water pollution, farmland
contamination, poisoning and even death. Table 3.1 presents several major environmental
accidents from 2000 to 2010. These accidents have led to productivity loss in farmland and
fisheries, and exposed thousands of Chinese citizens to health risks. The direct financial
loss was estimated to be more than tens of millions of dollars (China Environment Year-
book, 2010). The cost to clean up the damages and restore the ecosystem was even beyond
estimation.
These accidents have also given rise to social unrest. For victims, getting timely and
fair compensation for health and property damages is challenging. This is in part due to
the inadequacies of China’s legal system when it comes to environmental issues. Litiga-
tion is often very lengthy, and evidentiary burdens are sometimes unreasonable. Moreover,
establishing a causal effect and assessing the damages requires special expertise. When
it comes to health issues, compensation is often inadequate, owing to a lack of precedent
for quantifying damages. For example, when a chemical company in Hunan was found
to be responsible for blood lead levels in 13 children that exceeded China’s national stan-
dard, families of 11 of the children were denied compensation on the grounds that their
condition did not require medical procedures or drugs and thus the court had no procedure
for calculating damages due to lead in the blood. The two children with the highest blood
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levels were able to obtain only 10,000 RMB, or approximately $1,600, in compensation.1
The outrage of the public sometimes results in mass demonstration and protests. In those
cases, the government has to step up to handle the damages and reassure the victims before
it turns into a public crisis.2
Source: China Environment Yearbook, 2007-2015
Figure 3.1: Number of Environmental Accidents: 2006-2014
Environmental Accident Date Polluting Firms Province Consequence
Duyun dam collapse 9/11/2002 Lead and Zinc Mining Firms Guizhou Water and land contam-
ination
Aniline explosion and leakage 11/13/2005 Jilin Petrochemical Company Jilin 6 killed; 70 injured;
River contamination
Lead poisoning 8/2/2009 Dongling Group Shaanxi 851 children poisoned
Cadmium pollution 8/6/2009 Xianghe Chemical Plant Hunan 26 killed; Many poi-
soned; Farmland con-
tamination
Copper acid water leakage 7/3/2010 Zijin Mining Group Fujian River contamination;
Financial loss of $4.6
million from fisheries
Xingang oil spill 7/16/2010 Dalian New Port Liaoning Marine contamination
Source: Various news reports
Table 3.1: Major Environmental Accidents in China: 2000-2010
1See the news report at http://view.news.qq.com/original/intouchtoday/n3448.
html.
2News coverage on protests can be easily found online, such as this one: http://www.
europe-solidaire.org/spip.php?article15399.
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3.2.2 Environmental Pollution Liability Insurance
To deal with growing public concern about the environment and ensure fair compensation
for environmental damages, the Chinese government introduced environmental pollution
liability insurance as a new economic instrument. Environmental liability policies origi-
nated in industrialized countries in the 1960s. One prominent example of such regulation
is the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CER-
CLA), also known as the Superfund, passed by the US Congress in 1980. Under CERCLA,
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) can identify parties responsible for hazardous
substances releases to the environment and either compel them to clean up the sites, or
undertake the cleanup on its own using the Superfund (a trust fund). The EPA may recover
the costs by working with the U.S. Department of Justice to pursue the responsible party
through the court system. Approximately 70 percent of Superfund cleanup activities have
been paid for by parties responsible for the cleanup of contamination.3
In China, the development of the environmental pollution liability insurance involves
three stages (Feng et al., 2014). The insurance was first introduced to a few northeastern
cities in 1991 (Congjun and BinChik, 2012). However, the enrollment was low, as only 15
firms had purchased coverage between 1991 and 1994 (Born and Chen, 2013). The second
phase took place in 2007 when “The Guidelines on Environmental Pollution Liability In-
surance” (The Guidelines) was issued jointly by the Ministry of Environmental Protection
(MEP) and the China Insurance Regulatory Commission (CIRC). The Guidelines encour-
aged local governments to experiment with promoting the insurance. Four provinces and
four cities were chosen as pilots by the end of 2008.4 These places represent different geo-
graphic regions of China. By 2012, 14 cities have launched trial applications of the policy.
The third phase started in February 2013 when the central government promulgated “The
Guiding Opinions on Pilot Scheme for Compulsory Environmental Pollution Liability In-
surance” (The Opinions). The Opinions mandated the insurance to be purchased by all
firms dealing with heavy metals. The insurance was also recommended for certain other
industries (see Table 3.2). According to The Opinions, three types of expenses are covered
by the insurance in case of accidental pollution: (1) third-party liability (personal injury,
death and property loss), (2) necessary and reasonable expenses incurred by the insured to
save a third party’s life (including expenses for medical treatment) or to prevent or mitigate
the loss of property of any third party, and (3) necessary and reasonable clean-up expenses
incurred by the insured in order to control the extent of pollution or to remediate contami-
3U.S. EPA, Factsheet, “Superfund Trust Fund and Taxes: Setting the Record Straight,” October 7, 2003.
4These are Jiangsu, Hubei, Hunan, Henan, Chongqing, Shenzhen, Ningbo, and Shenyang.
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nated waters and land in accordance with environmental legislation.
Required Miners and processers of heavy non-ferrous metal ore
Heavy non-ferrous metal smelting
Lead battery manufacturing
Leather and leather product manufacturing
Chemical raw material and chemical product manufacturing
Recommended Petrochemical
Producers, warehousers, users and transporters of dangerous chemicals
Hazardous waste treatment plants
Industries with dioxin emission
Table 3.2: Industries Required or Recommended to Purchase the Pollution Liability Insur-
ance
Guided by The Opinions, each province is responsible for working out its own imple-
mentation plan based on local conditions. Therefore, there is considerable variation across
regions in terms of roll-out pace, enforcement strength and industry coverage. As of 2017,
about two-thirds of the provinces have implemented the policy in some capacity. To moti-
vate firms to purchase the insurance, compliant firms are generally given access to special
environmental protection funds and priority in bank lending, while non-compliance trig-
gers sanctions, such as negative environmental impact assessments, suspension of access
to special environmental protection funds and credit downgrades.
In this paper, we study whether the mandatory pollution insurance policy improves
firms’ environmental compliance. Although the effect on environmental accidents is inter-
esting, we do not have enough observations on accidents given that they are rare in nature.5
Instead, we focus on how the mandatory pollution insurance affects the relatively “small”
violations of environmental regulations. On one hand, having insurance can lead to moral
hazard and cause firms to take less care in their production process. This will result in
more violations. On the other hand, two channels exist to incentivize polluters to improve
their operation and increase compliance with environmental legislation. The first channel
is through the environmental risk assessment conducted by a third party as required by the
government. Third party experts evaluate firms’ characteristics such as production scale,
location, and operational procedures and determine their riskiness. More risky firms will
be required to purchase insurance with higher coverage at a higher expense.6 They can also
5For example, in Shenzhen, the first insurance payout happened in 2015 – eight years after the initial
implementation.
6 The coverage requirement can range from 150k to 1.5 million dollars.
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provide suggestions on how to reduce their risks. For example, if loopholes in pollution
treatment are identified during the assessment, they can advise firms on how to fix them.
The second channel lies in how the premiums are structured. Insurance companies take
into account firms’ past environmental compliance records when setting their premiums.
Firms with no violation records will be offered discounts. This provides another channel to
incentivize firms to comply with environmental regulations.
3.2.3 A Case Study of Shenzhen
We perform a case study of Shenzhen to examine the effect of the mandatory pollution
insurance policy on firms’ environmental compliance. The city of Shenzhen is the only
pilot city in South China, and one of the first to implement the insurance policy on a large
scale. It is located in the relatively developed Pearl River Delta, bordering Hong Kong to
the south.
Shenzhen is selected as a pilot largely due to its status as an experimental field for both
economic reform and environmental protection. Shenzhen was singled out to be the first
special economic zone of China in 1980, and has proven to be one of the most robust and
fastest growing cities in the country since then. Shenzhen is also regarded as a “green” city.
It was named the nation’s first model city for environmental protection in 1997, and there-
after won other awards such as “model city for protection of ozone layer” and “national
greenery model city.” It has been a test field for a number of environmental policies. For
example, in 2013, Shenzhen became one of seven cities to pilot China’s regional carbon
emission trading system.
Shenzhen is a suitable case for the empirical analysis for two reasons. First, being a
pilot city, Shenzhen has a large number of insured firms and a relatively long history of
implementing the policy. The mandatory insurance requirement was first introduced in
2008 for firms producing hazardous waste, and then extended to other industries such as
hazardous chemical and lead battery producers, sewage and garbage disposal plants, and
electroplating and circuit board factories in 2012. The coverage reflects Shenzhen’s indus-
trial structure and includes firms that pose the highest environmental risks to the public. As
of 2015, a total of 747 firms were subject to the insurance mandate in Shenzhen. Second,
Shenzhen is one of the few regions that publicly list the names of required and insured firms
and continuously update the lists from year to year. This allows us to keep track of each
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firm’s status (e.g. whether a firm was required to purchase insurance and whether it actu-
ally purchased it in each year) and associate it with the environmental violation records of
that firm. For the analysis, we focus on the electroplating and circuit board manufacturing
industry (hereafter referred to as ECB). ECB companies account for about 75 percent of all
the required firms. Aside from having a large number of firms, they also produce relatively
homogeneous products. 7
For comparison, we use the city of Dongguan as a control group. Dongguan is adjacent
to Shenzhen and has a similar industrial structure. Figure 3.2 shows the location of the
two cities. Dongguan did not impose any insurance requirement until 2016. We exploit
this difference in implementation speed to examine the effect of the insurance mandate.
We also include the paper-product industry and the textile & dyeing industry as controls.8
These two industries are also regular polluters but are not required to buy the insurance due
to their relatively low risk of causing environmental disasters.
3.3 Model
This section presents a simple conceptual model of firms’ optimal safety effort and com-
pliance behavior with and without the mandatory pollution liability insurance. Suppose
a competitive hazardous industry is comprised of risk-neutral homogeneous firms. Firms
may exert costly safety effort e to comply with environmental regulations. The level of
safety effort affects both the number of environmental accidents, and the number of rel-
atively “small” environmental violations which is the variable of interest in the empirical
section.9 The number of accidents and the number of violations are both random vari-
ables with means µa(e) and µv(e), respectively. We assume µ′a(e) < 0, µ
′′
a (e) > 0, µ
′
v(e) < 0,
µ′′v (e) > 0. In the case of an environmental accident, the social damage is Cs, while firms
7By contrast, although hazardous chemical producers are also required to purchase the insurance, depend-
ing on which chemicals they produce, the production process can be very different, making direct comparison
across firms less viable.
8We compile the list of firms in those industries by selecting firms which pay pollution discharge fees
(indicating they are polluters) and have certain relevant characters in their names. For example, we will
pick out polluting firms that contain “paper” in their names and put them under the “paper-product industry”
category. This is not perfect as not all paper-product companies have “paper” in their names. But if whether
containing “paper” or not in the name is uncorrelated with the other characteristics of the firm, this process
gives us a random sample of firms in this industry.
9We assume that accidents and violations are always detected. For simplicity, we also assume fines are
equal to damages for violations. The results still hold qualitatively if we assume fines are instead a fraction
of social damages.
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Figure 3.2: Location Map of Shenzhen and Dongguan
pay C f , 0 < C f < Cs, due to reasons described in Section 3.2.1. The difference between
C f and Cs is either borne by the victims or paid by the government. For simplicity, we
assume both C f and Cs are constant. That is, the safety effort affects only the likelihood of
an accident but not the severity of an accident. In the case of an environmental violation,
firms have to pay fines F which are also assumed to be constant. The cost of effort is T (e)
with T ′(e) > 0 and T ′′(e) > 0.
First, consider a case where there is no liability insurance requirement. A firm chooses
e to minimize its overall cost, which consists of effort cost and environmental cost:
T (e) +µa(e)C f +µv(e)F
The optimal safety effort e∗ satisfies the first-order condition T ′(e) +µ′a(e)C f +µ
′
v(e)F = 0.
On the other hand, the socially optimal effort level es minimizes T (e) + µa(e)Cs + µv(e)F
and satisfies T ′(e)+µ′a(e)Cs +µ
′
v(e)F = 0. Intuitively, since firms have to pay only a portion
of the actual damages related to environmental accidents, they will exert insufficient effort
to comply with environmental regulations. A formal proof of this statement is provided as
follows.
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Proposition 1 With no pollution liability insurance, the optimal safety effort e∗ is less than
the socially optimal effort es. Hence, the expected number of environmental violations is
higher than the socially optimal level.










It is easy to show that T
′(e)+µ′v(e)F
µ′a(e)
is a decreasing function of e. Hence, we have e∗ < es.
Since µv(e) is a decreasing function of e, it follows that µv(e∗) > µv(es). Q.E.D.
Now let us consider how the mandatory pollution liability insurance changes firms’
incentives. The insurance protects firms from liability for environmental accidents but not
for environmental violations. Firms purchase this insurance from insurers in a competitive
market. Each firm pays a premium R and gets full coverage in case of environmental
accidents. If insurers are naive in the sense that they ignore moral hazard, they will charge
a fair premium R equal to the expected value of the social damages µa(e∗)Cs. If insurers
are sophisticated, they will anticipate moral hazard and set up a premium structure that
incentivizes safety effort. The premium can not depend on firms’ safety effort directly,
since effort may not be fully observable. However, insurers can adjust rates based on firms’
accident and regulatory compliance history.
Proposition 2 With the pollution liability insurance, when insurers set fixed premiums,
firms exert less safety effort than e∗. As a result, the expected number of environmental
violations exceeds µv(e∗). However, a properly designed premium structure can incentivize
firms to exert the socially optimal effort level.
Proof : If premiums are fixed, a firm chooses e to minimize T (e)+R+µv(e)F. Note that
R is not a function of e. Therefore, the optimal effort level en satisfies T ′(en)+µ′v(e
n)F = 0.
Since T ′(e∗) +µ′a(e
∗)C f +µ′v(e
∗)F = 0 and µ′a(e
∗) < 0, we have
T ′(e∗) +µ′v(e
∗)F > T ′(en) +µ′v(e
n)F.
Given that T ′(e) +µ′v(e)F is an increasing function of e, e
n < e∗. As a result, the expected
number of violations increases, i.e., µv(en) > µv(e∗).
However, if R is a function of the number of violations v, a firm chooses e to minimize
its overall cost including the expected premium, T (e) + E(R(v(e)) +µv(e)F. For certain R
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functions, the optimal effort may be higher than e∗. In particular, a R function that satisfies
E(R(v(e))) = µa(e)Cs can induce the socially optimal effort level. Q.E.D.
In sum, whether the number of environmental violations increases or decreases as a
result of the mandatory pollution liability insurance depends on whether the insurance pro-
vides sufficient incentive to combat moral hazard. In the next sections, we empirically
examine the effect using data from Shenzhen and Dongguan.
3.4 Data
To measure firms’ environmental performance, we use a database from the Institute of
Public & Environmental Affairs (IPE).10 IPE is a non-profit environmental research or-
ganization registered and based in Beijing, China. Since its establishment in June 2006,
IPE has dedicated itself to collecting, collating and analyzing government and corporate
environmental information. The IPE database provides a wealth of information regarding
environmental violations committed by companies and factories. The records are drawn
from various sources, including reports from news articles and local environmental protec-
tion agencies. Each record identifies the name of the polluter, describes the violation, and
documents the date, the supervision agency and the record source.
We use the number of violations a firm commits in a year to measure its environmental
performance. A violation can be any misconduct from exceeding pollution limits to oper-
ating pollution treatment devices inappropriately or failing to obtain environmental permits
for new projects. Some violations are detected through onsite inspection, while others are
found using automatic monitoring devices. We remove two types of records. First, we
remove entries related to firms’ annual environmental credit rating grades, as they reflect
firms’ overall environmental performance in a given year and hence double count any vio-
lations firms have already committed. Second, we remove any records that are the results
of special enforcement actions. Over time, local environmental protection agencies may
take special enforcement actions that temporarily intensify the inspection effort, and thus
affect the number of detected violations. To rule out this effect, we go over the cases very
carefully and remove all the records that are the results of such actions. This leaves us with
1,933 violation records for 1,064 firms in the sample from 2006 to 2014.
10http://www.ipe.org.cn/
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City Industry Number of Firms Average Number of Violations
Shenzhen ECB industry 557 0.10
paper-product industry 14 0.06
textile & dyeing industry 29 0.07
Dongguan ECB industry 165 0.13
paper-product industry 128 0.09
textile & dyeing industry 171 0.06
Notes: This table reports the number of firms and the average number of violations per firm per year for each
industry in each city based on data from 2006 to 2014.
Table 3.3: Summary Statistics of the Data
Table 3.3 presents summary statistics for the three industries in Shenzhen and Dong-
guan. The numbers vary across cities and industries. On average, for every 100 ECB firms,
10 violations are committed per year in Shenzhen, while 13 violations are committed per
year in Dongguan. To motivate the regression analysis, we plot how the average number of
violations changes over time for different groups as shown in Figure 3.3. This figure allows
us to examine pre-treatment trends in the number of violations. In general, the movements
in Shenzhen and Dongguan track each other closely before 2012. The number of violations
was low before 2012 and increased substantially after 2012. Due to the lack of data, the
cause of this sudden increase is not entirely clear, but is likely to be a result of changes
in several factors. The most likely factor contributing to the increase is the delegation of
supervision power to lower levels. Before 2013, only the environmental supervision branch
directly under the municipal environmental protection agency has the punitive power, but
afterwards this power was delegated to all protection bureaus at districts and towns. This
change increased the number of supervisory personnel, and thus could lead to a sudden
increase in the number of violation records.11Other factors that may have contributed to
the increase include greater scrutiny on polluters and the increasing usage of automatic
monitoring devices.12 Because of these possible changes, a direct before-after comparison
will be problematic and therefore we focus on the difference in numbers across cities. For
ECB firms, the gap became larger after 2012, which suggests that the policy might have an
impact. However, the change in the gap could have been driven by an idiosyncratic shock
to one city but not the other around the same time as the policy was implemented. Indeed,
11A principal at the policy and regulation division of Dongguan’s environmental protection agency con-
firmed this in an interview with Dongguan Daily. See the news at http://news.sun0769.com/dg/
headnews/201311/t20131106_2985615.shtml.
12In 2006, none of the violations was detected by automatic monitoring devices, while in 2014, about 10%
were. Automatic monitoring devices make detection of violations easier and hence can explain part of the
increase in the number of violations.
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we do see a wider gap for the industries in which firms were not required to purchase in-
surance after 2012 as well. This motivates us to look at a third difference – the difference
between required and non-required industries. This will take care of any city-level shock
that affects the number of violations in all three industries.
Figure 3.3: Average Number of Violations by Year, Industry and City
3.5 Empirical Evidence
The empirical strategy is conceptually a triple difference estimation. We want to compare
(i) Shenzhen vs. Dongguan (first difference), (ii) before and after the introduction of the
liability insurance (second difference), and (iii) industries covered vs. not covered by this
policy (third difference). Specifically, we estimate the following equation:
Vioit =αS henzheni +βECBi + Yeart + θS henzheni ∗ECBi + ECBi ∗Yeart
+ S henzheni ∗Yeart +γS henzheni ∗ECBi ∗Postt + εit
Vioit is the number of violations firm i committed in Year t. S henzheni is a dummy
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indicating if firm i is in Shenzhen. ECBi is a dummy indicating if firm i is in the ECB
industry. Yeart are dummies for year fixed effects, and Post is equal to one for years after
2012 and zero otherwise. γ is the measure of the treatment effect we are interested in. We
present results from three models: OLS, a poisson model and a negative binomial model.
The negative binomial model is most preferred given its capability of dealing with overdis-
persed count data.13 For all specifications, standard errors are clustered at the industry-city











Model OLS Poisson Neg bin Neg bin Neg bin Neg bin
Treatment effect -0.30*** -3.66*** -3.64*** -3.83*** -3.67*** -3.63***
(0.04) (1.15) (1.15) (1.13) (1.15) (1.15)
Change in expected value (%) -73 -97 -97 -98 -97 -97
Number of observations 9,576 9,576 9,576 8,512 8,244 7,749
Notes: Treatment is considered as “being required to purchase the pollution liability insurance”. Treatment effect
corresponds to the estimate of coefficient γ in the model.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level
Table 3.4: Effect of the Mandatory Pollution Liability Insurance on Environmental Viola-
tions
Results are shown in Table 3.4. To compare the magnitude in the OLS specification
with the magnitude in the count specifications, we also present the percentage change in
the expected number of violations attributable to the policy for all regressions.14 With the
full sample, for all three specifications, the treatment effects are negative and statistically
significant at the 1% confidence level. In the OLS specification, the insurance requirement
leads to a 73 percent reduction in the expected number of violations, while in the count
models, the estimated change is even larger, a drop of 97 percent.
13The Poisson process assumes equality of the mean and variance, whereas in empirical settings the vari-
ance is often larger than the mean. This overdispersion leads to faulty inference. In our sample, the overdis-
persion parameter is estimated to be 1.38, significantly different from 0. Hence, we can reject the poisson
model in favor of the negative binomial model. Nevertheless, we include the poisson regression results for
robustness check.
14For the count specifications, the percentage change in the expected number of counts is equal to
exp(β)− 1. For the OLS specification, the percentage change in the expected number of counts is equal
to βE(Yi |S henzhen=1,ECB=1,Post=0,Year≥2012) .
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The rest of the columns in Table 3.4 present results from three robustness checks. The
first robustness check excludes observations in year 2012. The mandatory insurance re-
quirement for ECB firms was introduced on May 30, 2012. Therefore, those firms had no
obligation to purchase the insurance for the first 5 months of 2012. Additionally, it may
take some time for the policy to take effect. Therefore, we exclude all observations in
year 2012. The second robustness check only includes the ECB firms in Shenzhen that are
consistently required to purchase the insurance from 2012 to 2014. The list of required
firms was adjusted every year to account for entries, shut-downs, or exits. Of the 557
required firms in Shenzhen, 409 firms were on the required list every year from 2012 to
2014. So for the second robustness check, we only include those firms. Finally, we exclude
non-compliant firms. While we consider the treatment as “being required to purchase the
insurance”, in reality not every firm is in compliance with this policy and the effect can
differ based on whether they have actually purchased the insurance or not. About two fifths
of the required firms have not purchased the insurance as of 2014. In the last column, we
present the results where only the compliant firms are included. Overall, the results suggest
that the estimates are very robust to these different sample selection criteria.
3.6 Conclusion
This paper provides empirical evidence on the effect of mandatory pollution liability in-
surance on firms’ environmental compliance performance. The total drop in violation inci-
dents is estimated to be 73-97 percent and statistically significant at the 1 percent level. As
the insurance policy continues to roll out on a national scale, this paper provides a timely
evaluation of its effectiveness.
Several caveats apply. First, we estimate the treatment effect on the treated. The results
may not directly apply to other regions and industries. In particular, as the model suggests,
the effect depends on the premium structure. Although I find the insurance reduces viola-
tions in Shenzhen, to the extent that other regions may adopt a different premium formula,
firms’ compliance behavior may be different in those places. Therefore, a cross-region or
cross-industry comparison of the effectiveness of this policy will be a direction for future
research. Second, for the analysis, we assume away any shock that affects only one indus-
try in only one of the cities. We consider such a case to be unlikely, given that the cities
are next to each other and firms in those cities serve a much larger national and even global
market. However, this is a possibility that we cannot completely rule out. In particular,
the number of violations is subject to enforcement strength. Although we have done our
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best to tease out special inspections, we cannot observe the enforcement effort directly. If





This section provides details on the market processes under the bilateral trading market and
the centralized auction market.
A.1 Scheduling and Dispatch Under the Bilateral Trading
Market
Before the redesign, ERCOT was a bilateral trading market. The operation of the market
consists of two major phases.1
1. Day-ahead scheduling process
Load serving entities and generation resources negotiate privately with each oth-
er to buy and sell energy. The resulting bilateral contracts specify the transfer of
electricity at negotiated terms such as duration, price, and time of delivery. In the
day-ahead period, market participants are required to submit their “balanced sched-
ules” to the ERCOT ISO through Qualified Scheduling Entities (QSEs) which are
qualified by ERCOT to submit schedules for a portfolio of generators and power
purchasers. These schedules specify the origins and destinations of power flows by
congestion zone for each 15-minute settlement interval.2 The scheduled resource
production should not deviate from the forecasted demand beyond an established
range. ERCOT analyzes the day-ahead schedules and notifies the QSEs of anticipat-
ed inter-zonal congestion. Market participants are allowed to adjust their schedules
to relieve the forecasted congestion. Once the schedules are accepted by ERCOT, the
1There is also an adjustment period between the day-ahead period and the operating period.
2ERCOT divides its territory into 4 congestion zones. A congestion zone is a group of buses that have
similar shift factors on commercially significant constraints. Dividing the entire grid into several congestion
zones simplifies the modeling of the network.
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generators are “physically” committed to produce the scheduled quantity unless be-
ing instructed to increase or decrease their production in the balancing market. Any
uninstructed deviation exceeding 1.5% or 5 MWh of the QSE’s schedule results in
a penalty payment (Sioshansi and Hurlbut, 2010). 95% of the overall generation is
scheduled through this process.
2. Real-time balancing market
During the day-ahead scheduling process, generation resources also submit balancing
energy bids for adjusting their generation relative to their scheduled quantities. In
real-time, ERCOT manages energy imbalance and transmission congestion between
zones by intersecting the bidding functions separately for each zone. For intra-zonal
congestion, ERCOT deploys resources based on the generic fuel cost factors and shift
factors to resolve local transmission constraints.
A.2 Scheduling and Dispatch Under the Centralized Auc-
tion Market
Under the centralized market design, market participants put their generation resources at
the disposal of ERCOT. These resources are centrally dispatched to minimize generation
costs. The operation of the centralized auction market also consists of two phases.
1. Day-ahead operation
In the day-ahead period, market participants submit offers to sell energy for each
hour of the operating day. The supply offer may contain three parts: the startup
offer, the minimum-energy offer and the energy offer curve. These offers are used
in the day-ahead energy market. Participation in the day-ahead energy market is
voluntary and does not physically commit a resource to come on-line. In 2011, day-
ahead purchases account for approximately 40 percent of the real-time load (Potomac
Economics, 2012). After the completion of the day-ahead energy market, ERCOT
executes a reliability unit commitment process to ensure that it has enough capacity
committed to serve the forecasted load for the operating day.
2. Real-time operation
While bilateral trades and the day-ahead energy market transfer financial responsi-
bility among QSEs, the Security Constrained Economic Dispatch (SCED) program
actually dispatches the resources in the real time. ERCOT utilizes a network opera-
tion model which represents the system with critical information on characteristics,
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ratings, and operational limits of all elements of the transmission grid. On-line re-
sources are dispatched in economic order according to their submitted energy offer
curves. The execution of SCED results in locational marginal prices at approximately
4,000 nodes.3
3Hence, the centralized market is also known as the “nodal market.”
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APPENDIX B
Proof of Firm X’s Optimal Strategy
Denote the quantities Firm X supplies at node B and C as QB and QC . The supply coming
from node A is 300 + QB. Hence, the residual demand for Firm X at node C is QC = 600−
(300 + QB)−QB− 100(PC − 8) = 1100− 2QB− 100PC . Equivalently, PC = 11− 0.02QB−
0.01QC . To obtain PB, note that if we increase production at both A and B by 1 MW each,
production at C can be reduced by 2 MW to meet the same level of demand at C. The
resulting prices, therefore, satisfy the relationship PA+PB=2PC. Firm X’s problem is:
max
QB≥0,QC≥0
(11−0.02QB−0.01QC −7.2)∗QC + [2∗ (11−0.02QB−0.01QC)−5−9]∗QB
The kuhn-Tucker conditions with respect to QB and QC are
∂
∂QB
= 8−0.08QB−0.04QC ≤ 0
∂
∂QC
= 3.8−0.04QB−0.02QC ≤ 0














The majority of a power plant’s coal is purchased through long-term contracts. Therefore,
I use monthly plant-level coal receipt cost data from EIA-923 forms as the relevant coal
prices. Some previous studies have used spot market coal prices to approximate the op-
portunity costs for coal plants (Mansur (2008), Mansur and White (2012)). However, spot
market prices are not appropriate proxies for opportunity costs for two reasons. First, there
is evidence that the pass-through from spot market price to contract price for coal is fairly
long and incomplete. Chu et al (2015) find that a 1% change in the coal spot price leads to
only an approximately 0.11% change in the contract prices received by power plants even
after 12 months. Second, power plants consistently pay a sizable premium for contract coal
over spot coal, which suggests that there are industrial or institutional barriers to taking ad-
vantage of the cheaper spot coal. Joskow (1987) and Jha (2014) attribute this phenomenon
to transaction-cost economics and regulatory-induced risk aversion, respectively.
The fuel receipt cost data are publicly available for regulated plants.1 There are 16
coal plants in ERCOT, 6 of which are regulated. For deregulated plants, I approximate
the coal prices in the following way. Power plants in Texas purchase two types of coal:
lignite from Texas and sub-bituminous coal from the powder river basin in Wyoming. Only
2 regulated plants purchase lignite. Since lignite is produced within Texas, I assume that
the transportation costs are relatively small while the content of the coal matters more for
the price. Hence, I use the coal prices paid by plant Pirkey to approximate the prices for
deregulated plants, since the characteristics of coal purchased by Pirkey are close to the
average lignite being purchased. However, for sub-bituminous coal, the transportation cost
is likely to be important. Therefore, I match every deregulated plant to its closest regulated
1Unfortunately, access to the proprietary data on deregulated plants from EIA requires US citizenship.
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neighbor and use the matched plant’s coal price as its price. I am able to find a match
for every deregulated plant within 100 miles. In the very few cases where no price data are
available for a certain month, I use the average price of the months preceding and following
that month instead. Table C.1 summarizes the matching outcomes. The final price for each
plant is the quantity-weighted monthly receipt price.
Regulation Status Coal Plant Fuel Type Matched Coal Plant
Deregulated Big Brown SUB Gibbons Creek
LIG Pirkey
Coleto Creek SUB J T Deely
Limestone SUB Gibbons Creek
LIG Pirkey




Oak Grove LIG Pirkey
Sandow No 4 LIG Pirkey
Sandow No 5 LIG Pirkey
Twin Oaks Power One LIG Pirkey
W A Parish SUB Fayette Power Project
Regulated Gibbons Creek SUB
Fayette Power Project SUB
J K Spruce SUB
J T Deely SUB
Oklaunion SUB
San Miguel LIG
Notes: This table shows the matching results for coal plants in ERCOT. As explained in the text,
each deregulated plant is matched to a regulated plant that purchases the same type of coal.
Table C.1: Matching Outcomes for Coal Plants in ERCOT
C.2 Natural Gas Price
Daily natural gas spot prices are collected from SNL Financial. I use prices at the Agua
Dulce, Katy, Waha, and Carthage hubs for units in the South, Houston, West, and North
zones, respectively. Prices at the four hubs track each other very closely.
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C.3 Variable Operation and Maintenance Costs (VOM)
Variable O&M costs include scheduled and forced outage maintenance, water supply cost-
s, and environmental equipment maintenance. I use the standard VOM costs published
by ERCOT (ERCOT, 2012). These costs differ by fuel and technology type. For coal,
combined-cycle natural gas, natural gas combustion turbine and steam turbine , VOM costs
are $5.02, $3.19, $3.94 and $7.08 per MWh (in 2009 dollars), respectively.
C.4 Emission Allowance Price
Power plants in ERCOT are subject to three programs: the Acid Rain Program (ARP), The
Clean Air Interstate Rule (CAIR) annual SO2 program and The Clean Air Interstate Rule
(CAIR) annual NOx program. The ARP, established under Title IV of the 1990 Clean Air
Act (CAA) Amendments, requires major emission reductions of SO2 and NOx, the primary
precursors of acid rain, from the power sector. It is a nationwide program affecting large
fossil fuel-fired power plants across the country. CAIR was finalized in 2005, and took ef-
fect in 2009 for NOx and 2010 for SO2. The CAIR SO2 and NOx annual programs require
further reductions for large electricity generating units in 28 eastern states including Texas.
Not all generating units are affected by these three programs. To determine each generating
units’ coverage status, I use information provided by the EPA’s Air Markets Program Data
(AMPD) and cross check my data with The Code Of Federal Regulations Parts 72 and 96
(40 CFR Part 72 and Part 96).
All three programs are cap-and-trade programs designed to allow power plants to ar-
range for the cheapest possible reductions among covered sources to meet the overarching
cap. For each ton of SO2 emitted, ARP compliance requires the surrender of 1 ARP al-
lowance, while CAIR compliance requires an additional ARP allowances of prompt vin-
tage. For each ton of NOx emitted, 1 NOx annual allowance has to be deducted. Generally,
these allowances are traded among companies and individuals through brokers. I acquire
daily SO2 and NOx allowance price indexes from a leading over-the-counter energy bro-
kerage firm based in Texas. I use the last trading price each day as the relevant price. For
non-trading days, I approximate the price by taking the average of the prices from the two
trading days preceding and following that day.
Compared to the fuel cost, the emission cost makes up a very small portion of the
variable cost. For coal power plants, the emission cost on average counts for only 0.96%
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of the marginal cost. For natural gas generators, the percentage is less than 0.3%.
C.5 Wholesale Electricity Price Data
From ERCOT, I also collect the real-time post-redesign electricity prices at four hubs:
Houston, North, South and West. A hub’s price is the simple average of the locational
marginal prices (LMPs) of nodes within that hub.2 When there is no congestion, the hub
prices are the same throughout the system. However, if congestion does exist, LMPs differ
from node to node, as do the hub prices. Therefore, I define an hour to be congested if
the electricity prices at the four hubs are not the same. Congestion is quite common in my
sample. Of all the hours in the post-redesign sample period, about 60% are congested.
2Locational marginal prices (LMPs) are prices at a given network node based on the cost of delivering
the next MW of energy to that node. For example, if there is a need for 10 MW at a network node, the LMP
would be determined by the cost of delivering the 11th MW.
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APPENDIX D
Additional Results and Robustness Checks
This section contains additional evidence that supports the validity of the empirical ap-
proach and the robustness of the findings. First, I show that although the market conditions
pre- and post-redesign are not exactly the same, they are quite comparable: the span of
demand at each zone overlaps; the changes in fuel prices are moderate; and the entry or
exit of generators does not exert a significant impact on the market. Second, I provide fur-
ther evidence showing that the observed changes pre- and post-redesign are not seen in any
other year.
D.1 Comparison of Demand
Figure D.1 compares the distributions of demands at all eight weather zones pre- and post-
redesign. To be consistent with the main specification, demand at each zone is divided
into 12 equal-frequency bins based on the entire sample so that the number of observations
falling into each bin is the same. Comparing the distributions before and after the redesign,
we can see that they all have observations in each bin. The common support enables the











































































































































































































D.2 Comparison of Fuel Prices
Changes in fuel prices are the only factor that may substantially affect generators’ marginal
costs. Other factors either do not change over time or constitute a very small portion of the
total cost. In order to attribute the changes in generation to market redesign, it is essential
to look at how fuel prices change during the sample period.
Figure D.2 plots the movement of coal prices and natural gas prices during the sample
period.1 Overall, the magnitudes of the price changes for both natural gas and coal are quite
small. On average, coal and natural gas prices during the post-redesign period increase by
19.8 cents (10%) and 12.9 cents (3%) respectively, compared to the pre-redesign period.
The ranges of the price differences are also similar pre- and post-redesign.
Notes: This figure shows the time series of average coal prices and natural gas prices as well as the price
differences between coal and natural gas during the sample period which runs from June 1, 2010 to August
31, 2011 excluding December 1, 2010 to December 17, 2010 and February 2, 2011 to February 5, 2011. The
vertical line indicates the time when the market redesign took place.
Figure D.2: Average Coal and Natural Gas Prices During the Sample Period
The comparability of fuel prices pre- and post-redesign provides reassuring evidence
1To be consist with the sample I use for estimation, I exclude dates between December 1, 2010 to Decem-
ber 17, 2010, for the lack of ERCOT data, and also dates between February 2, 2011 and February 5, 2011,
for the unusual winter storm.
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that my results are not driven by any price trend. Furthermore, I directly include a quadratic
form of the price differences between natural gas and coal in the baseline model to capture
any effect caused by relative changes in fuel prices. I find it is unlikely that the relative
changes in fuel prices are the cause of the switch between coal and natural gas generation,
because on average, the price for coal increases more than the price of natural gas during
the post-redesign period. This would make coal generators less appealing, but instead I
find coal displaces natural gas generation by significant amounts in the post-redesign peri-
od. Finally, as a robustness check, I focus on only natural gas generators and run similar
regressions as equation (1.1) using demand for natural gas generation instead of thermal
generation as the explanatory variable. Since within natural gas generators, the marginal
cost order is basically determined by their heat rates and unaffected by the change of natural
gas prices, any relative change in generation within them is not confounded by movements
in fuel prices. The results from these regressions support the main findings: generation
from cheaper resources, such as combined-cycle generators and combustion turbines, in-
creases while generation from more costly resources, i.e. steam turbines, decreases.
D.3 Entry and Exit of Thermal Generators
In the estimation, I restrict the sample to all thermal generating units that were continually
operating during the entire sample period. There are three thermal units that have either
entered or exited the market in this time period. Two steam turbines, each with a capacity
of 800 and 115 MW, exited the market prior to the market redesign. One combined-cycle
natural gas plant with a capacity of 640 MW entered the market on March 16, 2011. These
events pose the question of whether the observed changes in generation are caused by the
entries or exits of these units. Although it is difficult to separate out their impact, I contend
that this is not likely to be the case. The average hourly generation quantities from these
three units while they were operating were only 69.9, 4.71 and 127.9 MWh, respectively.
Their generation accounts for less than 0.1% of the total thermal generation. Given the
magnitude of their average generation, I conclude that my results cannot be explained by
their entry and exit.
D.4 Placebo Tests
Finally, I perform placebo tests to show that the magnitudes of the changes I find are indeed
unusual and not seen in other years. For this exercise, I consider two hypothetical scenarios
where a redesign occurred on December 1, 2009 as well as December 1, 2011 and repeat
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Plant Name Entry/Exit Time Technology Capacity Average Marginal Average Hourly
(MW) Cost($) Generation (MWh)
Tradinghouse Exit Sep 19, 2010 Natural gas: 800 43.5 69.86
steam turbine
Permian Basin Exit Nov 21, 2010 Natural gas: 115 49.4 4.71
steam turbine
Jack County Entry Mar 16, 2011 Natural gas: 640 32.5 127.9
combined cycle
Notes: This table lists the thermal generators that have entered or exited the market during the sample period. The data come from
EIA-860 forms. The entry/exit dates are also cross-checked with CEMS data and web sources.
Table D.1: List of Entering and Exiting Generators
the analyses. I focus on a very short time period – two months centered around the (real
or pseudo) implementation date of the market redesign. Given the short time frame, I am
confident that there are no significant changes in capacity, cost, or other aspects of the
market. I run regressions similar to equation (1.1). However, given fewer observations,
I simplify the analysis by using the entire thermal demand instead of the demand at each
zone, and fitting a constant line within each bin. I also estimate the regressions at a more
aggregate level by fuel and technology types. For type i at hour t, the estimation equation





where Bink is equal to one if the thermal demand falls into that bin and zero otherwise. Fig-
ure D.3 reports the results for the four categories: coal, combined-cycle natural gas, natural
gas combustion turbines and steam turbines. From Figure D.3, we can see that the changes
in 2010 are not seen in other years. For coal and combined-cycle natural gas, the “before”
and “after” generation lines are intertwined and close to each other. Only in 2010 when
there is a real redesign do we see significant gaps between these two lines. For combustion
and steam turbines, the parameters are estimated less precisely. For steam turbines, there
is evidence of a significant effect of market redesign when demand is over 20,000 MWh.
Again, Figure D.3 shows that this is not seen in other years. For combustion turbines, the
changes in 2010 are not very different from changes in 2009 and 2011. Overall, the 95%
confidence intervals of the two generation lines overlap for 2010. However, this does not
contradict the earlier findings that generation from combustion turbines increases, because
the increase occurs only during high demand hours. Figure 1.7 shows that the effect start-
s to appear when the thermal demand exceeds 50,000 MWh. Given that the demand in
November and December never reaches 50,000 MWh, it is unsurprising that the effect of
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The Effect of the Market Redesign on Wind
Generation
Wind energy has a significant presence in the ERCOT region. As of 2010, installed wind
capacity in ERCOT amounts to 9,363 MW, representing 9.45% of the overall generating
capacity. As shown in Figure E.1, the majority of the wind farms are located in the west of
Texas, with the rest in the southern portion of the state.
Notes: This figure is constructed by the author using data from the 2010 EIA-860 forms.
Figure E.1: Installed Wind Capacity in ERCOT: 2010
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Wind power is determined by the availability of wind resources. Specifically, the level
of electrical output a wind turbine can generate is proportional to its cross-sectional area
as well as the cube of the wind speed. Wind is non-dispatchable in the sense that wind
speed cannot be changed by will. However, cases do occur in which potential wind gener-
ation is not fully used. This happens largely because of the limited transmission capacity
between western Texas where the most abundant wind resources are, and eastern Texas
where most of the demand is. In some cases, wind generation has to be curtailed to avoid
overloading the congested transmission lines.1 Therefore, it is natural to ask if the market
redesign results in fewer incidences of curtailment and better integration of wind resources.
Without data on the frequency of wind curtailments, I rely on a regression approach to
examine the effect of market redesign on wind generation. The idea is that wind output is
determined mostly by wind speed. If there is no effect, we should expect to see that the
observed wind output curve stays more or less the same pre- and post-redesign. However,
if redesign leads to better integration of wind resources, we should see a significant gap
for wind outputs given the same wind speed and other market conditions before and after
the redesign. During the sample period, 350 MW of additional wind capacity was added.
To rule out this effect, I restrict my sample to a subset of wind farms that were already in
operation as of June 1, 2010. I conduct the analysis at the weather zone level. For zone i at
hour t, I estimate the following regression:








βikDemandkt +δh + εit
where GENit is the aggregated wind generation quantity in zone i at hour t. A f ter is a dum-
my that indicates the post-redesign period. WS P is the average wind speed cubed.2 I also
include demands in all eight weather zones as well as hourly fixed effects. Newey-West
standard errors are calculated using 24-hour lags.
Table E.1 shows the results of the coefficients for A f ter at the five weather zones which
have non-zero installed wind capacity. Although there appear to be some increases in
generation when only wind speed is included in the model, this effect goes away as more
1See Sioshansi and Hurlbut (2010) for an extensive discussion of the ERCOT market protocols with
respect to wind generation.
2Wind speed data are collected from National Centers for Environmental Information(NCEI)’s Integrated
Surface Database. One station is selected from each county where wind farms exist and data are available.
The average wind speed for each zone is calculated by taking the simple average of the stations within that
zone.
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Weather Zone Model Model Model
(1) (2) (3)
Far West 53.01** 31.30 -19.98
(24.03) (23.35) (26.15)
North 21.54*** 18.34*** 2.94
(5.17) (4.76) (5.57)
North Central 26.72*** 12.42 -26.19**
(9.95) (9.18) (12.10)
Southern 7.68 8.42 -13.56
(8.98) (9.05) (12.03)
West 23.97 -44.42 -129.56***
(36.28) (30.45) (36.04)
Cube of WSP Y Y Y
Hour N Y Y
Demand N N Y
Notes: Newey-West standard errors are reported in the parentheses.
*** Significant at the 1% confidence level
** Significant at the 5% confidence level
Table E.1: Effect of the Market Redesign on Wind Generation
controls are added. In the full model, there is no evidence of a significant increase in wind
generation after the redesign. If anything, the results seem to suggest that wind generation
is lower in some of the regions post-redesign.
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